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Eichmann in Jerusalem—and in West
Germany: Eichmann Trial Witnesses and the
West German Prosecution of Operation
Reinhard Crimes, 1958–1966
MICHAEL BRYANT*
For to what lengths will that man go in the dark who fears nothing
but a witness and a judge?
—Cicero, Laws

The trial of Adolf Eichmann fifty years ago was a landmark in
several respects. It marked not only the prosecution of an important
génocidaire who had placed his energies and talents in the service of the
Final Solution, but also furnished the survivors and the families of the
victims a world stage from which to tell their personal stories of
persecution at the Nazis’ hands. In contrast with the Nuremberg war
crimes trial, which, in preferring documentary evidence to personal
testimony, had deemphasized the singularity of the Holocaust, the
Eichmann trial restored the voices of Jewish victims directly affected by
Eichmann’s actions. In the decades since the Eichmann trial many
scholars have observed these historic aspects.1 One feature of the
Eichmann trial that has received less attention from scholars is its
impact on West German prosecutions of Holocaust crimes.
Coincidentally, Eichmann’s arrest and trial occurred at roughly the
same time that West Germany was intensifying efforts to locate Nazi

* Associate Professor, Bryant University.
1. On the “trial by document” at Nuremberg, see TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1993); LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY
OF JUDGMENT 11–94 (2001); BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG
(1977); MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 1945–46 (1977); DONALD
BLOXHAM, GENOCIDE ON TRIAL (2001). On the opportunities afforded by the Eichmann trial for
Jewish victim testimony, see LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT 97–182
(2001); DAVID CESARANI, BECOMING EICHMANN 250–51, 268 (2004).
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offenders within its own borders and bring them to trial.2 In this essay, I
will explore some of the contributions to West German Holocaust trials
rendered by Jewish survivors who also testified at the Eichmann trial. I
will suggest that these contributions were not only valuable to the West
German trials, but essential to their success as well. Jewish witnesses
provided West German courts with evidence critical to proving specific
crimes by former death camp guards and to classifying the defendants
as perpetrators of, rather than accomplices to, the mass murder of the
Jews. Without their testimony, some of the worst lower-level offenders
within the Nazi death camp system would likely have either escaped
judicial punishment altogether or received reduced sentences.
For purposes of economy, I will focus on the major West German
trials of the three “Operation Reinhard” death camps: Belzec, Treblinka,
and Sobibor. As described in fuller detail below, Operation Reinhard
was the program set in motion in October 1941, when Heinrich
Himmler, chief of the SS, entrusted the destruction of the Jewish
population in Poland’s “General Government” (the part of Poland not
incorporated into the Reich) to SS Police Leader of the Lublin district,
Odilo Globocnik.3 It was Globocnik who organized the construction of
Belzec, Treblinka, and Sobibor as literal murder centers to annihilate
the 2,284,000 Jews of the General Government.4
I will further narrow the scope of this article by focusing on the
defendants in these trials convicted as perpetrators of mass murder
under the German homicide law (§ 211, StGB). An exception will be
made respecting the Belzec trial where, for purposes of contrasting the
drastically different outcome of this abortive case with the relatively
successful results in the Treblinka and Sobibor proceedings, I will
examine the acquittals of seven of the eight defendants and the final
conviction of the eighth, Josef Oberhauser, as an accomplice to murder.
Only four defendants were convicted as perpetrators of murder in the
three major Operation Reinhard cases: none in the Belzec trial, three in
the Treblinka trial, and one in the Sobibor proceeding.5 As we will see,
2. In 1960, West Germany asked Argentina to extradite Josef Mengele, the Nazi doctor
who performed medical experiments on prisoners in Auschwitz. See e.g., The Search for
U.S.
HOLOCAUST
MEM’L
MUSEUM,
Perpetrators,
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005167 (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
YAD
VASHEM,
3. Aktion
Reinhard,
http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/microsoft%20word%20-%205724.pdf (last visited Feb. 5,
2012).
4. Id.
5. Kurt Bolender, a defendant who would have surely been convicted as a perpetrator in the
Sobibor trial, committed suicide before the end of the trial. See DICK DE MILDT, IN THE NAME OF

2012]

Eichmann Trial Witnesses

341

Eichmann trial witnesses were indispensable to their convictions as
mass murderers warranting the harshest punishment under West
German law.
I. BELZEC, SOBIBOR, TREBLINKA: A PRIMER ON THE OPERATION
REINHARD CAMPS, 1941-1943
The death camp was the apotheosis of Nazi Jewish policy, which
from the beginning had dreamt of ridding the German Reich of its
Jewish population.6 Throughout the 1930s that policy had advanced
from the curtailment of Jewish civil liberties, to the marking and
segregation of Jews from “Aryan” society, and then to the confiscation
of their property.7 By the summer and fall of 1941, the penultimate
stage of this policy, which called for Jewish expulsion and resettlement
to places like Nisko near Lublin and the French colony of Madagascar,
had become impracticable. In October 1941, the Nazi leadership
decided to solve the “Jewish problem” through an infinitely more
radical means—the physical extermination of every Jew within its
reach.8
It is a cruel coincidence of history that this decision was taken
shortly after Hitler formally ended the “euthanasia” program in August
1941.9 In the two years prior to its official discontinuance, the Nazi
leadership, through Hitler’s personal chancellery, had administered
“Operation T-4”— a program for the mass murder of the mentally
disabled at six primary killing sites inside the German Reich.10 A gas
chamber disguised as a shower room, complete with phony
showerheads unconnected to any waterline, was installed at each of
these sites.11 Some 30 patients could be gassed within 20 to 30 minutes

THE PEOPLE: PERPETRATORS OF GENOCIDE IN THE REFLECTION OF THEIR
PROSECUTION 257–61, 276, 281 (1996).
6. CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION: THE
OF NAZI JEWISH POLICY, SEPTEMBER 1939–MARCH 1942 424–27 (2004).

POST-WAR
EVOLUTION

7. On the structure of Nazi Jewish policy (definition, expropriation, concentration,
annihilation), see 1 RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS, 49–59 (2003)
[hereinafter HILBERG I].
8. THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 318.
9. Id. at 192.
10. Id. at 190–91. The mental hospitals chosen as killing sites were Bernburg, Hadamar,
Brandenburg, Grafeneck, Sonnenstein, and Hartheim. Hitler’s Chancellery administered the
program through offices located at Tiergartenstrasse No. 4 in Berlin—hence the code name of the
program, “Operation T-4.”
11. DE MILDT, supra note 5, at 60–61.
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by means of bottled carbon monoxide released into the hermetically
sealed room.12
The Nazis also waged their war of extermination against the
disabled in the Wartheland (the portion of Poland annexed to Germany)
and East Prussia, where a unit under SS Sturmbannführer Herbert
Lange murdered the handicapped in “gas vans” disguised as commercial
vehicles. Lange’s unit bundled the victims at the rear of these vans in
sealed compartments into which pure carbon monoxide was pumped as
the van was driven away.13 In late spring of 1940, Lange’s men
murdered 1,559 German mental patients and 400 Polish patients at the
Soldau transit camp in East Prussia.14 Between the onset of the
campaign against the mentally ill, and its termination in August 1941, a
cadre of experienced killers was groomed, possessing both the will to
carry out their orders unswervingly and the technical know-how of mass
extermination.
When Hitler decided to kill all the European Jews within his grasp,
his underlings harnessed the expertise of these T-4 murder technicians
to a series of separate yet interlocking programs, which formed the heart
of the Final Solution.15 Among the most audacious of these programs
was “Operation Reinhard,” the effort to kill all of the Jews concentrated
in the General Government.16 Himmler entrusted its organization and
administration to his SS and Police Leader for Poland’s Lublin district,
SS-Obergruppenführer Odilo Globocnik.17
From late October 1941 until January and February 1942, a
“commando” of 30 men previously employed in the mass murder of the
disabled was sent to Lublin.18 These included seasoned euthanasia
specialists Dr. Irmfried Eberl, director of the T-4 killing centers at
Brandenburg and Bernburg; Dr. Helmut Kallmeyer, a chemist in the
Criminal Technical Institute of the Reich Police Office; Christian Wirth,
12. Id.
13. THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 188–89.
14. Id. at 186–89.
15. Id. at 416. Himmler had “loaned” SS men to Hitler’s Chancellery for execution of the
euthanasia program between 1939 and 1941. In the fall of 1941, Himmler “was going to collect
his debts by taking back his SS personnel experienced in gassing and borrowing some of Viktor
Brack’s men was [sic] well.” Brack was the deputy of Hitler’s Chancellery and the Chief of its
Section II, which had primary responsibility for carrying out the “euthanasia” program in
Germany. The German staffs of the Operation Reinhard camps would ultimately consist of
hardcore SS men like Kurt Franz and T-4 employees with only nominal ties to the SS.
16. The program may have been code-named after the head of the Reich Security Main
Office, Reinhard Heydrich.
17. THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 419–20.
18. Id. at 419.
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former detective superintendent of the Stuttgart Criminal Police
Headquarters (a department of the Gestapo) and director of various T-4
gassing centers; Josef Oberhauser, a T-4 employee and future liaison for
Wirth; and Dr. Herbert Linden, the Reich Delegate for Mental Hospitals
and Nursing Homes. 19 Eberl, Kallmeyer, and Linden were among the
euthanasia personnel assigned by Globocnik in Lublin to construct
Belzec, the first of the Operation Reinhard death camps.20 The precise
number of euthanasia operatives sent to establish and administer the
death camps of occupied Poland is unknown. West German
investigations into death camp crimes in the 1960s, however, mention a
figure of 92 former T-4 personnel assigned to Operation Reinhard in
Lublin.21
Before it was chosen as a site for Operation Reinhard’s first death
camp, Belzec was a German labor camp. It was built in early 1940 for
Jewish slave laborers involved in constructing fortifications on the
border between Soviet and German territory.22 The labor camp was
liquidated in the fall of 1940.23 A year after its dissolution, Josef
Oberhauser was sent to Belzec to supervise the building of a new camp.
Twenty Polish workers did the actual construction. They erected three
buildings on the site following the blueprints of an ethnic German
carpenter.24 The smallest of the three contained three rooms of equal
size. Each room had stout inner and outer doors capable of being
secured with crossbars on the outside, and equipped with rubber seals.
Pipes underlay the floors of the three rooms. The Poles completed the
job on December 22, 1941.25 Thereafter, former Soviet POWs from the

19. HILBERG I, supra note 7, at 49–53.
20. See testimony of Viktor Brack at Nuremberg, contained in the files of the investigation
and prosecution of Belzec personnel housed in the federal archive at Ludwigsburg, Germany.
Testimony of Viktor Brack, Oct. 12, 1946, BArch B 162/3168 (Eidesstattliche Erklärung Viktor
Hermann Brack). Ascertaining the precise identities of all T-4 personnel Brack assigned to
Globocnik in the fall of 1941 has proven elusive; the names of Eberl, Kallmeyer, and Linden
were identified by the Sachbearbeiter for the Belzec case, Dietrich Zeug, in June 1960; see id.
(“Operation Reinhard” Concise Summary of Current Results of Investigations by the Central
Office of the State Justice Administrations, 9 June 1960). See also Josef Oberhauser
Interrogation, Sept. 15, 1960, BArch B 162/3169; THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra
note 6, at 419.
21. See e.g., YITZHAK ARAD, BELZEC, SOBIBOR, TREBLINKA: THE OPERATION REINHARD
DEATH CAMPS 17 (1987). Arad adduces a figure of 450 people assigned to Operation Reinhard:
153 SS and police under Globocnik’s command in Lublin, 205 SS and police members, and 92
T-4 personnel.
22. THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 419.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 419–20.
25. Id. at 420.
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Ukraine, trained after their capture at the SS training center at Trawniki
(Lublin), installed a ramp along the north face of the small building and
a rail line that led into an adjacent field.26 In this field the Ukrainians
excavated a large trench.27 The ethnic German carpenter informed
Oberhauser that the small building would be a gas chamber.28
Around this same time, Christian Wirth became commandant of
Belzec, and Oberhauser became his emissary to Globocnik in Lublin.29
Under Wirth, Jewish workers built the guard towers and remaining
buildings on the site.30 Wirth also introduced an innovation in the killing
technology inspired by his work with the euthanasia program. He
rejected bottled carbon monoxide in favor of using a diesel engine as a
poison gas generator, thereby splicing Lange’s gas van with the
stationary gas chamber of the euthanasia centers.31 Wirth’s hybrid could
achieve higher killing rates without reliance on outside providers of
bottled gas.32 With this technical adaptation, he created the first
vertically integrated death camp. The influence of Nazi euthanasia was
evident not only in the choice of personnel and the employment of a
fixed gas chamber, but also in outward camouflage to deceive the
victims.33
In February 1942, Wirth and his men were ready to test their
brainchild. An experimental gassing was held in which 150 Jewish
workers were murdered in Belzec’s gas chamber.34 Afterward, Wirth
departed Belzec for Berlin, but returned in March with his commando
comprising ex-T-4 men. These individuals were admitted to the SS on
arrival; they wore the gray uniforms of the SS and were assigned SS
ranks. Although putatively under Globocnik’s command, they remained
intimately linked to the offices in Berlin responsible for organizing and
administering euthanasia.35 They vacationed at an Austrian retreat for
euthanasia personnel and received additional pay and personal mail
from a courier employed by euthanasia officials, who visited Lublin
each week.36

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; ARAD, supra note 21, at 24.
THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 420.
Id.
ARAD, supra note 21, at 20–24.
Id.
THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 420.
ARAD, supra note 21, at 18.
Id.
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In the preceding months, the camp had been subdivided into two
subcamps: the northern and western subcamp, Camp I, was designated
the reception and administration area; and the eastern subcamp, Camp
II, was devoted to extermination.37 In mid-March 1942, a transport of
Jews from Galicia and a subsequent one from the Lublin ghetto arrived
at Belzec.38 The camp was ready for them. From mid-March to April 14,
waves of transports washed into Belzec from Polish towns in the Lublin
district—Zamosc, Piaski, and Izbica. They included 30,000 Jews
deported from the Lvov district, characterized in Nazi reports as
“nonworking” Jews—a fatal classification.39
By mid-April, 75,000 Jews had been killed.40 When the first stage
of genocide had ended in June 1942, the Jewish death toll at Belzec
stood at 93,000.41 At this time, the gas chambers were expanded from
three to six, all disguised as shower facilities. The capacity was more
than 2,000 victims per gassing, or twenty freight cars.42 Transports to
Belzec stopped in December 1942, and mass murder ground to a
permanent halt.43 On Himmler’s orders the camp was razed and
converted into a farm for occupancy by a Ukrainian guard.44 As many as
600,000 Polish Jews were killed there.45 Only two Jews deported to
Belzec survived.46
Belzec was the model for the two other death camps of Operation
Reinhard: Sobibor and Treblinka. Richard Thomalla, an agent of the SS
Central Building Administration (which had also commissioned the
building of Belzec), headed the project to construct a death camp near
the village of Sobibor, located eight kilometers south of Wlodaway in
the Lublin district.47 Local Poles were hired to build the camp and 80
Jews from local ghettos were sent there to assist in the construction.
They toiled under the watchful eyes of Ukrainian guards from
37. Id. at 27.
38. Id. at 72.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 73.
42. Id. at 74.
43. Id. at 126.
44. Id. at 371.
45. Id. at 127. Polish Jewish victims at Belzec alone accounted for 414,000 victims. Arad
reaches the 600,000 figure by adding the tens of thousands of Jews from other European countries
deported to Lublin ghettos who were later murdered in the Belzec camp. Arad’s figure is
primarily based on the report prepared by the Polish Committee to Investigate Nazi Crimes in
Occupied Poland, and matches the estimate of the state court of Munich at Josef Oberhauser’s
trial in 1965. It is the most commonly accepted estimate of Jewish fatalities at Belzec.
46. DE MILDT, supra note 5, at 276.
47. ARAD, supra note 21, at 30.

346

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 34:339

Trawniki.48 Once the camp was done, these Jewish workers were
murdered.49
Globocnik appointed Franz Stangl, another T-4 man, as the first
commandant of Sobibor, schooling him in techniques of industrialized
Jew-killing through a crash course at Belzec.50 Here he encountered
Christian Wirth, whom he first met on the edge of a knoll overlooking a
pit filled with thousands of corpses.51
The Sobibor camp was segmented into three sub-camps. Camp I
consisted of the entrance, a railroad ramp, and lodging for the camp
staff and work Jews.52 Camp II was a reception area, in which recently
arrived Jews disrobed and where their possessions were sorted and
stored by camp staff.53 The “tube,” a passage enclosed in barbwire and
interwoven tree branches, joined Camp II to the extermination area at
Camp III.54 Guards drove the victims through the tube into the gas
chambers. After gassing, the corpses were dumped into trenches 10
meters by 15 meters wide and 5 meters by 7 meters deep.55
Between May and November 1942, at least 75,000 Jews from
Lublin ghettos were transported to their deaths in Sobibor.56 Genocide
crested there in three successive waves: May to June 1942, October to
November 1942, and March to July 1943.57 In the intervals between
these three waves, smaller transports of Jews arrived in the camps in
trucks and horse-drawn vehicles.58 The state court of Hagen suggested in
its 1966 verdict in the main Sobibor trial that these smaller transports of
Jews may have bypassed the gassing facilities entirely; instead, they
might have been led directly to the trenches in Camp III and shot.59
When Sobibor was closed in November 1943, it had murdered
between 150,000 and 250,000 Jewish deportees.60 Unlike its forerunner
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. C.F. RUETER & D.W. DE MILDT, 25 JUSTIZ UND NS-VERBRECHEN 84–88 (State Court
of Hagen, Case No. 642a) (2001).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See ARAD, supra note 21, at 80. The figure of 75,000 is from the state court of Hagen’s
1966 verdict in the main Sobibor trial. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 52, at 84. Arad cites a
higher figure of 90,000–100,000 gassed between May and July 1942 alone.
57. ARAD, supra note 21, at 80–86.
58. Id.
59. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 52, at 88.
60. There are wide disparities in the figures cited in the literature. Arad adheres to a figure
of 250,000, based on a transport size of 2,000–2,500 deportees. See e.g., Arad, Die ‘Aktion
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and model, Belzec, Sobibor’s awful harvest of human lives was not
complete: a revolt within the camp in October 1943 enabled scores of
prisoners to escape. Most were recaptured and murdered, but thirty or
more eluded their captors and survived the war.61 Some of these
prisoners would later return to testify against their tormentors as
witnesses at the main Sobibor trial in 1965.62
Of the three camps administered by Globocnik from his
headquarters in Lublin, the champion of mass death was Treblinka,
located 65 miles northeast of Warsaw. Among Nazi murder sites
scattered across German-occupied Europe, only Auschwitz-Birkenau
claimed more Jewish lives than Treblinka.63 It consisted of two sub
camps—a labor camp for Polish gentiles and Polish Jews from the
Warsaw district (Treblinka I),64 and an extermination center (Treblinka
II).65 When the construction of the death camp began in late May-early
June 1942, genocide at Belzec and Sobibor was already in full swing.
Sobibor’s builder, Richard Thomalla, was the head of the Treblinka
construction team.66 The work teams that built the camp consisted of
Polish and Jewish prisoners from Treblinka I. All of the Jewish
prisoner-workers were eventually murdered. As if to consecrate the site
in an unholy baptism, the German overseers killed and brutalized the
Jewish laborers during Treblinka II’s erection.67 A Polish prisoner
involved in the labor team at Treblinka recalled that, “during the felling
of forests, [the SS] forced Jews to stand beneath the trees which were

Reinhard’: Gaskammern in Ostpolen, in NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE MASSENTÖTUNGEN DURCH
GIFTGAS 177 (1983). His figures square with estimates by the state prosecutor of Hagen in the
main Sobibor trial. The higher figures may be based on a judicial report prepared by a Polish
judge after the war, who conducted interviews of survivors from the Sobibor camp. In his report
the judge affirmed that 250,000 victims were murdered at Sobibor. He arrived at this estimate
based on a transport size of 2,000 to 4,000 Jews, figures provided by a Polish railroad engineer.
The Hagen state court was persuaded, by contrast, that the documentation on transports from
Germany, France, and Czechoslovakia (the “Protectorate”) showed a transport strength of 1,000
people. With this lower number as its touchstone, the court offered a conservative estimate of
150,000 Jews murdered at Sobibor. The expert witness (Sachverständiger), Wolfgang Scheffler,
cited a figure of 151,000; the lay assessors (Schöffen) believed the number stood at 152,000.
RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 52, at 89 (Hagen Regional Court Verdict in the criminal case of
Kurt Bolender et al.).
61. ARAD, supra note 21, at 40.
62. Id.
63. See 3 RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS, 1320 (2003)
[hereinafter HILBERG III].
64. ARAD, supra note 21, at 37.
65. See id. at 40–43.
66. Id. at 37.
67. Id. at 40.
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about to fall down,” thereby causing the deaths of four Jewish workers.68
The SS supervisors conducted raids of the Jewish quarters, in which
they killed the Jews on the spot.69 These early acts of senseless cruelty
were only a preview of what would follow.
The extermination camp opened in July 1942 under its first
commandant, Dr. Irmfried Eberl, the former director of the T-4
euthanasia centers at Brandenburg and Bernburg.70 Its purpose was to
eradicate the 366,000 Jews in the Warsaw district, as well as Jewish
populations in Radom, Lublin, and Bialystok. 29,000 other European
Jews and thousands of Roma would perish in the gas chambers of
Treblinka during its one and one half year existence. At first, the camp
operated with three gas chambers, each measuring four meters by four
meters wide and 2.6 meters high.71 Following the pattern at Belzec and
Sobibor, they were disguised as showers: the ceilings of each chamber
were equipped with pipes and showerheads.72 Conveying the illusion of
a functional bath, the pipes routed carbon monoxide gas into the
chamber from a diesel engine located in an attached room.73
In late August to early September 1942, a “large gas chamber” was
built to improve the deadly work of the “small” ones, which had proven
inadequate to the tasks demanded of them.74 The brick building housing
the larger facility consisted of five gas chambers, five meters by five
meters wide and two meters high.75 Otherwise, the large gas chamber
resembled the smaller facility. Pipes conducted carbon monoxide
exhaust from a diesel engine installed in the adjacent “machine room.”76
After arrival in the camp, the deportees were “selected” for either
labor or extermination in the reception area.77 The latter group disrobed
in a barrack before being herded naked, blows from clubs, whips, and
fists raining down on them, through a “tube” connecting the reception
area to the gas chambers.78 The smaller chambers killed as many as 300

68. Id.
69. Id. at 39–40.
70. Rael D. Strous, Dr. Irmfried Eberl (1910–1948): Mass Murdering MD, 11 IMAJ 216,
217 (2009).
71. ARAD, supra note 21, at 42.
72. Id. at 42.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
HOLOCAUST
MEM’L
MUSEUM,
77. Treblinka,
U.S.
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005193 (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
78. Id.
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persons, and the larger 400 persons, at a time.79 After gassing, Jewish
work teams searched all the corpses for hidden valuables.80 The corpses
were then dragged to the burial pits, where they were covered with thin
layers of sand. In May 1943, two crematoria were installed, in which the
bodies of the victims were incinerated immediately after gassing.81
As at Sobibor, a prisoner revolt erupted late in Treblinka’s
existence. It began on August 2, 1943, led by work Jews sensing that
the camp, along with themselves, would soon be liquidated.82 Prisoners
gained access to the armory, secured weapons, and attacked the SS.83
They also set some of the camp buildings on fire as other prisoners
sought escape over the fence.84 Most were mowed down by guards
shooting from the camp watchtowers,85 and the majority of successful
escapees were later recaptured and shot anyway.86 Of the 750 fugitives,
only 70 survived Treblinka’s liquidation.87 Some of these survivors
joined their counterparts from Sobibor and appeared as witnesses
against camp personnel at the West German Treblinka trial in 1964.88
In the aftermath of the Treblinka uprising, the camp commandant,
Franz Stangl, made preparations to close the camp.89 When Stangl was
sent to fight partisans in Trieste, he was replaced by Kurt Franz. Franz
ordered that any trace of the crimes committed at Treblinka be
obliterated.90 He oversaw the demolition of the camp by 100 work
Jews.91 When it had been razed, all the work Jews were shot.92 Trees
were planted on the grounds and the site was given to a former
Ukrainian guard as a farm.93
When the last of the camps of Operation Reinhard were dismantled
in the fall of 1943, they had claimed the lives of nearly 1.8 million

79. ARAD, supra note 21, at 354.
80. See Treblinka, supra note 777.
81. ARAD, supra note 21, at 40–42; Indictment of K. Franz et al., StA Düsseldorf, 8 Js 10
904/59, BA, B 162/3848, 129–40.
82. ARAD, supra note 21, at 286.
83. Id. at 288–90.
84. Id. at 292.
85. Id.
86. DAVID CROWE, THE HOLOCAUST: ROOTS, HISTORY AND AFTERMATH 250 (2008).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 251.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Jews.94 Although the Nazis continued to murder Jews at AuschwitzBirkenau and other sites well after the closure of Belzec, Sobibor, and
Treblinka, the frightful work of annihilation at these camps accounts for
more than one-third of the Holocaust’s victims.95
II. BACKGROUND OF THE WEST GERMAN OPERATION REINHARD TRIALS
Given the enormity of the crimes committed at Belzec, Sobibor,
and Treblinka, it may appear scandalous that many death camp
perpetrators avoided punishment for their crimes until the 1960s,
particularly in West German courts. In fact, the reasons for the belated
confrontation with these lower-level killers in West Germany are
complex. The International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremberg
(1945–46), although touching on the extermination of the Jews, by no
means foregrounded the Nazis’ Final Solution.96 The only death camp
commandant available to testify at the IMT was Rudolf Hoess, the
former commandant of Auschwitz.97 While Hoess testified about the
existence of other death camps—specifically identifying Belzec and
Treblinka—the proceedings of the Tribunal scarcely addressed
Operation Reinhard.98 These failures of judicial representation were
understandable given the Allies’ lack of knowledge at this time of the
immensity of Nazi genocide—an ignorance they shared with the
German judicial authorities.99
Unawareness of the colossal proportions of the Holocaust was not
the only reason that the major West German trials of death camp killers
did not occur until the 1960s. Limits imposed by the Allies on German
courts’ jurisdiction over Nazi crimes also contributed to the delay. The
Allies closed all German courts in May 1945, only to reopen them
months later with significant restrictions on their jurisdiction over Nazi-

94. Id. at 247, 251. This figure includes both Operation Reinhard and the so-called “Harvest
Festival” (Erntefest) killings, in which Waffen SS and Order Police units shot between 42,000
and 45,000 Jews in three slave labor camps (Trawniki, Poniatowa, and Majdanek) over two days,
November 3–4, 1943; see also CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE
BATTALION 101 AND THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND, 133–42 (1998) (the state prosecutor of
Düsseldorf offered a “cautious estimate” of 1,750,000 Jews killed in the three death camps of
Operation Reinhard); see also Indictment, K. Franz et al., BArch B 162/3848.
95. Applying the calculations in Hilberg (citing a Jewish victim total of 5,100,000), 34.3%
of Holocaust victims were killed in the Operation Reinhard death camps. See HILBERG III, supra
note 63, 1320–21.
96. DE MILDT, supra note 5, at 248.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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era crimes.100 Under the Allied Control Council Law #10 (December
1945), German courts were only able to hear criminal cases involving
German defendants and German victims.101
A burst of prosecutions of Nazi crimes in German courts followed.
Between 1945 and 1949—before the establishment of West and East
Germany—German courts convicted 4,500 Nazi defendants of crimes
committed during the Third Reich, a figure that approaches the numbers
convicted in Allied military courts.102 None of these convictions related
to the genocide committed in the Operation Reinhard death camps.
Control Council Law #10 withheld from German courts any jurisdiction
over Nazi crimes inflicted on Allied nationals, and most of the victims
of the Operation Reinhard camps were Poles whose murders were thus
beyond the reach of German law.
German courts in the western half of the country first encountered
Operation Reinhard in the course of their investigations into euthanasia
crimes.103 Because the principal victims of the Nazi “euthanasia” of the
disabled were German nationals, these crimes fell within the jurisdiction
of the restored German judiciary as defined by Control Council Law
#10. In July 1946, the Frankfurt police arrested a mechanic named Josef
Hirtreiter on suspicion of involvement in the murder of the disabled at
the Hadamar killing center.104 While the charges against him were
ultimately dropped, in his interrogations by police Hirtreiter spoke of
his assignment to the “Malkinia” camp where Jews were gassed.105 A
July 1948 Frankfurt newspaper account reported that Hirtreiter had been
sentenced by a denazification court to 10 years of forced labor for his
participation in gassing as many as 5,000 Jews in the “concentration
camp Malkinia.”106
Alerted by the article on Hirtreiter, the Frankfurt prosecutor
launched an investigation into the Malkinia camp, which revealed that
the camp in question, although located near the hamlet of Malkinia, was
in fact Treblinka.107 The prosecutor expanded his investigation to

100. Id. at 22.
101. Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE CONTROL COUNCIL
FOR GER. arts. III–IV (1946) [hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10].
102. GERHARD WERLE & THOMAS WANDRES, AUSCHWITZ VOR GERICHT: VÖLKERMORD
UND BUNDESDEUTSCHE STRAFJUSTIZ 19 (1995).
103. DE MILDT, supra note 5, at 249.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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include Hubert Gomerski and Johann Klier - two men Hirtreiter had
identified in his 1946 interrogations as working with him in the Sobibor
death camp.108 Two Jewish survivors of Sobibor, Samuel Lerer and
Esther Raab, recognized a third Hirtreiter co-worker, Erich Bauer, when
they ran into him on the Kreuzberg fairgrounds in Berlin in 1949.109
When Raab recognized Bauer, he replied in astonishment, “How is it
that you are still alive?”110 Lerer and Raab reported Bauer to the police,
and he was arrested.111 Both Raab and Lerer would later testify as
survivor-witnesses in the 1965 Sobibor trial.
In 1950 a Berlin court tried and convicted Bauer, a gassing
technician at Sobibor, of murder as a perpetrator.112 Initially sentenced
to death (at that time, a murder conviction as a perpetrator carried with
it an automatic death sentence), his sentence was commuted to a life
prison term when the new West German state abolished capital
punishment.113 Gomerski and Klier were also tried in 1950, with
radically different results. Largely on the strength of Jewish survivor
testimony proving his acts were gratuitously cruel and sadistic,
Gomerski was convicted of murder as a perpetrator.114 Klier, however,
was acquitted based on his unrebutted defense of duress, a commonly
invoked defense in the later Operation Reinhard trials.115
Hirtreiter’s trial followed in March 1951, a proceeding
characterized by such lurid but credible accusations against the
defendant that the regional court judges hesitated at first to accept
them.116 When they had satisfied themselves of the veracity of the
witnesses and the authenticity of their stories, the judges convicted
Hirtreiter of murder as a perpetrator.117 Both he and his ex-colleague
Gomerski received life prison terms, the harshest punishment under
West German law after abolition of the death penalty.118
Thus, the West German judiciary had acquaintance with the crimes
of Operation Reinhard and Jewish survivor witnesses long before the
major death camp trials of the 1960s. These first encounters with
108. Id. Hirtreiter, Gomerski, and Klier had all been assigned to the Hadamar euthanasia
center and to the Operation Reinhard camps.
109. DE MILDT, supra note 5, at 391.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 250.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 253.
115. Id. at 252.
116. Id. at 254–55.
117. Id. at 255.
118. Id. at 254–55.
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Operation Reinhard, however, were fortuitous. Hirtreiter’s name arose
only because of the Frankfurt prosecutor’s investigation into Nazi
euthanasia, as did the names he identified during his police
interrogations, Gomerski and Klier. Bauer’s prosecution was possible
only because of his chance meeting with two survivors of Sobibor who
were able to recognize him four years after the war’s end. Before the
formation of a central clearinghouse devoted to documenting Nazi
crimes in 1958, criminal investigations typically began when private
citizens filed a Strafanzeige (“report of crime”) against a person
suspected of violating the German penal code.119 Such a system, as
applied to former death camp personnel, was clearly unworkable given
the paucity of survivors available to report a suspect to the police.
Other factors also contributed to the rarity of death camp trials in
West Germany between 1951 and 1960. For one, the West Germans
lacked both documentation from, and basic knowledge of, the Final
Solution for years.120 For another, state and federal criminal police ranks
were full of ex-Nazi officials.121 Furthermore, many witnesses,
important evidence, and crime scenes themselves were inaccessible
behind the Iron Curtain. All of these factors created a daisy chain of
impediments to prosecuting death camp offenders.

119. Eric Haberer, History and Justice: Paradigms of the Prosecution of Nazi Crimes, 19
HOLOCAUST GENOCIDE STUD. 487, 495 (2005).
120. The ignorance of even educated Germans in the 1960s about the fundamentals of the
Final Solution is illustrated by an incident in the 1960 trial of an Auschwitz physician. As a nonGerman survivor testified that he had seen the defendant on the ramp at Birkenau (the
extermination camp of the Auschwitz complex), he was interrupted by the chairman of the panel
of lay assessors (Schwurgericht), who admonished the witness that “this case doesn’t involve
Birkenau, but Auschwitz. So, Mr. Witness, what do you know about Auschwitz and the
defendant?” When the witness resumed his testimony, he again asserted that he had seen the
defendant on several occasions in Birkenau—and immediately drew a second interruption from
the chairman. “Mr. Witness, I’ve already explained that we’re not concerned here with Birkenau
but with Auschwitz. If you’re not able to understand the German language, may I perhaps call in
a translator?” The chairman was unaware that Auschwitz and Birkenau formed a unified camp, or
that the railway siding for the main camp at Auschwitz was in the subcamp Birkenau. Anecdote
told by Göttingen historian Hans-Günther Seraphim, reproduced in ANNETTE WEINKE, DIE
VERFOLGUNG
VON
NS-TÄERNATERM
IM
GETEILTEN
DEUTSCHLAND:
VERGANGENHEITSBEWALTIGUNGEN
1949–1969,
ORDER,
EINE
DEUTSCH-DEUTSCHE
BEZIEHUNGSGESCHICHTE IM KALTEN KRIEG (2002).
121. On the compromised West German federal and state police, see ANNETTE WEINKE,
EINE GESELLSHAFT ERMITTELT GEGEN SICH SELBST: DIE GESCHICHTE DER ZENTRALEN STELLE
LUDWIGSBURG 1958–2008 (2008); IRMTRUD WOJAK, FRITZ BAUER: EINE BIOGRAPHIE 285
(2009); MICHAEL GREVE, DER JUSTITIELLE UND RECHTSPOLITISCHE UMGANG MIT DEN NSGEWALTVERBRECHEN IN DEN SECHZIGER JAHREN 47, 66–67 (2001); WEINKE, supra note 120, at
165–66.
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One of the most important Holocaust trials in German history, the
Ulm “Einsatzgruppen” trial of 1958, dramatized the shortcomings in the
West German punishment of Nazi crimes and opened the door to muchneeded reforms in the Federal Republic. The Ulm proceeding began
when a civil servant and former SS-Oberführer, Bernhard FischerSchweder, sued for reinstatement to his former civil service position,
from which he had been removed due to his Nazi past.122 The labor
court that heard his petition dismissed it, prompting Fischer-Schweder
to protest his dismissal in a letter to a local newspaper.123 A rabbi
originally from Lithuania but living at the time in Stuttgart recognized
Fischer-Schweder as the ex-chief of the State Police field office in
Tilsit, Lithuania. In September 1955, the rabbi filed a Strafanzeige
against Fischer-Schweder, alleging his involvement in the shooting of
Lithuanian Jews during the summer of 1941. In the aftermath of
Fischer-Schweder’s arrest in May 1956, other participants in the
massacres were apprehended. In 1958, all the defendants were
prosecuted in the city of Ulm (state of Baden-Württemberg). They were
charged with murdering more than 5,500 men, women, and children in
August 1941 as members of a special commando unit active along the
German-Lithuanian border.124
As scholars of the postwar trials have noted, the Ulm trial became
the model for subsequent prosecutions of Holocaust-related crimes in
West German courts.125 Prior to 1958, Nazi war criminals, if hauled
before a court of the Federal Republic, typically faced their judges as
single individuals.126 The state prosecutor in the Ulm case indicted the
ten Tilsit defendants as a single group involved in a multifaceted
criminal transaction—one that encompassed numerous actors. This
approach influenced the West German trials of “euthanasia doctors,”
other Einsatzgruppen shooters, and death camp personnel in the 1960s.
In another regard, too, the Ulm verdict became an archetype for the
Federal Republic’s trials of Nazi crimes after 1958. Both the indictment
and the state court’s judgment characterized Hitler, Himmler, and
Heydrich as the “main perpetrators” of the Holocaust. For the court, this
meant that these men at the summit of the Nazi state conceived the Final
122. See Symposium, “The Murderers Among Them”—German Justice and the Nazis, 3
HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 137, 142 (1999) [hereinafter Hofstra Symposium].
123. See id.
124. WEINKE, supra note 120, at 12–13; GREVE, supra note 121, at 47; MARC VON MIQUEL,
AHNDEN ODER AMNISTIEREN? 151 (2004).
125. See e.g., JÖRG FRIEDRICH, DIE KALTE AMNESTIE 340–78 (1994); INGO MÜLLER,
HITLER’S JUSTICE 249–54 (1991); WEINKE, supra note 120, at 17–19.
126. See MÜLLER, supra note 125, at 251–52.
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Solution, assumed primary responsibility for it, and used the lower-level
defendants as tools to achieve their aims. Because the Ulm defendants
did not inwardly approve of the Final Solution, they were accomplices,
not perpetrators, in the court’s analysis. Fischer-Schweder was
accordingly convicted of complicity in murdering 526 Jews and
sentenced to a ten-year prison term; his co-defendants received prison
sentences of three to fifteen years.127
III. THE CREATION OF THE CENTRAL OFFICE/LUDWIGSBURG
The 1958 Ulm trial revealed to the West Germans that the
Nuremberg trials had not cleansed the Federal Republic of Nazi war
criminals. Instead, the spectacle of ten respectable citizens being
charged with heinous crimes thirteen years after the war’s end showed
that mass murderers were living comfortable and anonymous lives in
the Federal Republic. Many understood that the Ulm case was an
accident. But for the happenstance that the Stuttgart rabbi recognized
Fischer-Schweder from his letter in the newspaper, the trial would likely
have never happened, and the murderers of thousands in Lithuania
would have continued their postwar lives without fear of punishment.128
In order to conduct the investigation of Nazi crimes on a more
systematic basis, the justice ministers of the West German states
decided in October 1958 to establish an agency devoted to investigating
and documenting them.129 Headquartered in Ludwigsburg in BadenWürttemberg, the agency bore the cumbersome title of “the Central
Office of the State Judicial Administrations for the Investigation of
National Socialist Violent Crimes” (“Central Office”).130 The creators of
the Central Office imposed significant restrictions on its jurisdiction. It
had the power to investigate Nazi crimes and liaise with state justice
offices, but lacked any prosecutorial authority.131 Once it had completed
an investigation, the Central Office could do little more than send its
files to state prosecutors, who would decide whether or not to indict.132
The Central Office could investigate only Nazi crimes committed
beyond the Federal Republic’s borders.133 With this remit, the Central
127. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 52, at 642.
128. In this regard, the case bears comparison with the per accidens character of the
Hirtreiter, Gomerski, Klier, and Bauer trials.
129. Hofstra Symposium, supra note 122, at 142.
130. Id. at 154.
131. Id. at 142.
132. See Sabine Swoboda, Paying the Debts – Late Nazi Trials Before German Courts, 9 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 243, 251 (2011).
133. Id. at 252.
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Office opened for business in December 1958 under its first director,
the former lead prosecutor in the Ulm Einsatzgruppen trial, Erwin
Schüle.134
Given the creation of the Central Office and a renewed
commitment to investigate the crimes of the Final Solution, the
prospects for successful prosecution of Holocaust killers in West
Germany would have seemed encouraging. However, there were
systemic problems facing these trials. One of the most formidable of
these was the lack in many cases of specific evidence proving criminal
wrongdoing by suspected killers. The problem of evidence arose from
the very nature of Holocaust crimes, in which most or sometimes all the
victims had been killed. Documentation alone that linked a suspect with
a unit involved in ghetto clearings or guard duty at a Polish death camp
was not enough to secure a conviction, particularly where the potential
defendant had no command authority.135 As Helge Grabitz, a former
German prosecutor involved in trying Nazi crimes, has pointed out, this
basic lack of available proof meant that only 20 of the 101 known
ghetto clearings in the Lublin district of Poland—operations that sent
thousands to their deaths in Belzec, Treblinka, and Sobibor—could be
prosecuted.136
A further obstacle to these trials was the distinction between
perpetration and complicity in West German law, a difference already
drawn in the Ulm Einsatzgruppen trial.137 The tendency of German
courts after 1958 was to classify Nazi defendants as accomplices to the
murder of the Jews, unless there was evidence that the defendant
exceeded his orders—that is, unless he demonstrated his inward and
subjective approval of the Holocaust.138 Merely following orders was
not enough to convict a Nazi offender as a perpetrator of murder—the
judge had to be satisfied that he had acted from “base motives.”139 In
effect, this meant that there had to be proof the defendant acted
sadistically or from racial hatred. In many cases, such evidence could
only be provided by an eyewitness—and since the former camp
personnel were understandably reluctant to incriminate themselves,
134. WEINKE, supra note 120, at 28–29.
135. Helge Grabitz, Die Verfolgung von NS-Verbrechen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
und der DDR, in KEINE "ABRECHNUNG": NS-VERBRECHEN, JUSTIZ UND GESELLSCHAFT IN
EUROPA NACH 1945 157 (1998).
136. Id.
137. See DE MILDT, supra note 5, at 9.
138. See id. at 253 (“In the eyes of the court it left little doubt as to the brutal inner disposition
of the defendant at the time of his Sobidor days.”).
139. Id.
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proving base motives was mostly done through Jewish survivor
testimony.140
In sum, even where the prosecutor could tie the defendant to a
specific criminal act, additional proof was needed to show the defendant
was a perpetrator rather than an accomplice. If such proof were
unavailable, the court could only convict him of complicity to murder,
which translated into a more lenient punishment.141
IV. FIRST CONTACTS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL OFFICE AND THE ISRAELIS
CONCERNING THE DEATH CAMPS
Erwin Schüle, as head of the Central Office, was undoubtedly
aware of the challenge of gathering evidence adequate to sustain
indictments and convictions of death camp perpetrators. Hence, he must
have regarded the prosecution of Adolf Eichmann as a heaven-sent
boon.
Eichmann was arrested in May 1960, and his trial began in April
1961—during the time, in other words, when the Central Office was
conducting investigations into Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka. Whether
the Eichmann trial galvanized West German efforts to bring the
executors of the Final Solution to justice has been a subject of
controversy since the 1960s. Hannah Arendt believed the Eichmann
trial was the trigger to the large death camp trials in the Federal
Republic that followed in its wake.142 Schüle adopted a different view.
He asserted that the origins of pending investigations of Nazi death
camps preceded Eichmann’s arrest and trial.143 Whatever the merits of
either position, one thing is indisputably clear: the Germans coordinated

140. See id. at 258.
141. Id. at 254.
142. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EVIL (1963) (for her conclusions regarding the Eichmann trial).
143. The issue of primacy and influence has endured until the present day. In a recent article,
Louis Begley claims that the Eichmann trial “galvanized West German authorities, who moved
with spectacular results to prosecute notorious war criminals who had been living peacefully in
Germany, some of them having been previously ‘denazified.’” Louis Begley, The Day of the
REV.
BOOKS
(Dec.
8,
2011),
Hunter,
N.Y.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/dec/08/day-hunter/?pagination=false. In fact,
only days after Eichmann’s capture in May 1960, Israeli police officers were assigned to Yad
Vashem (the Israeli national Holocaust memorial) to work with staff members who had
previously helped the West Germans locate documents for their national trials of Nazi crimes.
This fact supports Schüle’s view that the West German investigations preceded Eichmann’s
arrest. See CESARANI, supra note 1, at 248.
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with the Israelis in securing the names of Eichmann trial witnesses who
could offer testimony at West German trials of Nazi perpetrators.144
The earliest official contact between the Israelis and Central Office
officials investigating Operation Reinhard crimes occurred in October
1959, a time that preceded Eichmann’s arrest by seven months. The
contact consisted of a letter in October 1959 signed by Werner, the
investigating officer for the Belzec case, and addressed to the chief
archivist of Yad Vashem, Dr. Josef Kermisz.145 The letter recounts the
sources of Werner’s information on Belzec and ends with a request for
the names and contact information of survivors who might reside in
Israel.146
In November, Yad Vashem responded to the Central Office’s
inquiry.147 According to Kermisz, there was only one survivor of
Belzec: a Lemberg Jew named Rudolf Reder, a name with which
Dietrich Zeug, the Central Office official in charge of the Sobibor
investigation, was already familiar. Kermisz was unsure whether Reder
was still alive, but he knew Reder had written an account of his
experiences at Belzec immediately after his liberation.148 The account
was published in a volume edited by the former Crakow branch office
of the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. Kermisz also provided
Werner with a reference to another book by Reder, devoted exclusively
to Belzec, which was published in 1945. Kermisz also listed 17 names
of suspects from the Belzec camp, including the assistant to the camp
commandant, Josef Oberhauser, and Lawrence Hackenholt, whom
Kermisz described as a chauffeur and machine operator involved in
grave excavation.149
Reder’s name had originally come to Zeug’s attention from his
review of the literature150 and Werner’s October correspondence with
Yad Vashem. In late October, Zeug had inquired of the International
Tracing Service at Bad Arolsen about Reder’s whereabouts. Arolsen
replied in early November that Reder had filed a claim for
compensation
with
the
Governmental
District
Office
144. See CESARANI, supra note 1, at 335.
145. Letter from Dietrich Zeug to Yad Vashem (Feb. 24, 1960) (on file with BArch B
162/4427).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Especially the Polish book DOKUMENTY I MATERIAŁY DO DZIEJÓW OKUPACJI
NIEMIECKIEJ W POLSCEIN (1946), in which Reder had authored a chapter on Belzec. Reder’s
contribution is found on pages 217–24.
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(Regierungsbezirkamt) for Restitution in Mainz.151 Zeug followed up a
week later with a letter to the Mainz Office, which replied with a
confirmation of Reder’s application in late November. It also sent along
Reder’s address and a copy of his application.
Appended to the application was an autobiographical sketch from
December 1954 describing Reder’s life before, during, and after his
internment at Belzec. He was born in the Polish town of Dembica on
April 4, 1881, but was living in Lwów152 when the Germans invaded the
USSR. At that time he was the owner of the largest soap factory in the
city. He was confined in the Lwów ghetto after its erection in December
1941 and compelled to work as a slave laborer in his own soap factory,
which the Germans had confiscated. On August 18, 1942, the Gestapo
arrested him at home and took him to the military installation
Podzamcza before internment in the Janowska camp—a
labor/transit/concentration camp. His stay there was brief, for the next
morning he and other prisoners were loaded amid a rain of blows into
railcars at the Kleparow train station. The next stop was the Belzec
death camp.153
Reder arrived in Belzec on August 17, 1942. His railcar was
unloaded and all save Reder and seven other men were immediately
gassed. In what was a hallmark of Nazi institutionalized murder, the
camp commandant, a Sudeten German named Fritz Irrmann, informed
the deportees they would be assigned to labor details after a shower.
Reder described the sequence of events:
All the [recently arrived] prisoners were brought into a large
barracks, where the women’s hair was cut. They were then driven
into a narrow corridor; there was a door at the end with an
inscription: “Bathing and Inhalation Rooms.” A flowerpot with a
single flower hung in front of the door. Behind the door was another
corridor, to the right were three doors and to the left three doors,
which led into six gas chambers. Each chamber held 750 people. The
building was made of concrete. I know from my own observation
that the gassing took no longer than 20 minutes . . . .The gas was
conducted through pipes powered by an engine located in a small
cubicle. I operated a machine that excavated trenches designated as
graves for the gassing victims. I also had to drag the corpses from the

151. Letter of International Tracing Service to Central Office (Nov. 3, 1959) (on file with
BArch B 162/3164).
152. In German, “Lemberg.”
153. Comment (Nov. 27, 1959) BArch B 162/3165; Sworn Statement of Rudolf Reder, at
240, BArch B 162/3165 (Dec. 7, 1954).
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gas chambers to the graves. Around 500 Jews were used in this last
154
activity.

Three transports arrived every day during Reder’s time in the
camp, each comprising fifty railcars of 12,000–13,000 Jews. Nearly all
the deportees were murdered and buried by the evening of their arrival.
Reder estimated the number of burial trenches at thirty; each was 100
meters long, 25 meters wide, and 15 meters deep. As many as 10,000
corpses could be buried in a single trench.155 When the grave was full,
the corpses were doused with lime and the trenches filled in with
sand.156
In his interrogation by the Munich prosecutor’s office in August
1960, Reder described how he escaped from Belzec. In November 1942
he traveled by truck to Lviv with a driver and four Ukrainian guards in
search of sheet iron to be used to build chimneys for ovens in the
camp.157 After arrival, Reder spent the night in a Gestapo building. The
next morning, he and the others loaded the iron. The guards left Reder
in the company of another guard while they went to dinner. When the
lone guard fell asleep in the truck, Reder slipped away and found refuge
with a woman he knew and whom he would later marry. Remarkably,
she lived in a building partly occupied by the Gestapo, and even worked
as a cleaning woman in their offices. Reder hid in this very building
until Lviv’s liberation by the Red Army. Irony piled on irony in the case
of Rudolf Reder. His future wife cared for a dog belonging to the
Gestapo. She diverted some of the meat given by Gestapo officials for
the dog’s maintenance to Reder, who lived on it until liberation.158
On November 30, 1959, Zeug sent a letter addressed to Reder to an
address in Toronto provided by the Mainz Restitution Office. After a
brief introduction informing Reder of the Belzec investigation, the letter
acknowledged him as “the sole surviving eyewitness to escape from
Belzec.” It then posed a series of questions to Reder, including whether
he had observed specific crimes (especially murder) committed in the
camp, and whether he was familiar with Josef Oberhauser and Gottfried

154. Sworn Statement of Rudolf Reder, supra note 153 at 240.
155. In his interrogation by a Munich prosecutor on August 8, 1960, Reder stated that each
trench held up to 100,000 corpses. The larger figure is very likely a typo. Roman Robak
Interrogation, BArch B 162/3168 (Aug. 8, 1960).
156. Id.
157. Presumably, the crematoria were designed to incinerate the bodies of victims already
murdered and buried in the camp trenches: see ARAD, supra note 21, at 177–78.
158. Roman Robak Interrogation, supra note 155.
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Schwarz.159 Zeug’s letter evoked no response from Reder. On January 7,
1960, Zeug sent a second letter to Reder, indicating that Gottfried
Schwarz was dead, and requesting information on Oberhauser, whom he
characterized as adjutant to the Belzec camp commander, Christian
Wirth.160
On January 19, Reder replied to Zeug’s letter, denying any
knowledge of Oberhauser. Zeug forwarded photos of Oberhauser to the
World Jewish Congress in New York with the request they be sent to
Reder for identification.161 Representatives of the World Jewish
Congress then contacted Reder, secured two sworn statements from
him, and forwarded these to the Central Office. The second of these
signified a breakthrough in the Belzec case: Reder recognized Josef
Oberhauser in the three photos shown to him. Reder wrote:
“[Oberhauser] wore a cap in the Belzec camp, and I saw him only in a
long SS dress coat. I am, however, certain that it is one and the same
person.”162
In March 1960, Schüle contacted Robinson at the World Jewish
Congress, requesting that Reder travel to Munich and positively identify
Oberhauser face-to-face. Months passed before Reder made the trip.
The Munich prosecutor’s office conducted the interrogations on August
8, 9, and 10, 1960. Ominously for the prosecution’s case, when
confronted by Oberhauser, Reder claimed he had never seen him.163
Consequently, the state court of Munich164 quashed the arrest warrant
for Oberhauser on August 10, 1960. At the end of the first week in
September, the senior prosecutor wrote Schüle that, unless
incriminating evidence from Poland or the US National Archives
emerged proving Oberhauser’s crimes at Belzec, the case against him
would be dismissed.165
Zeug responded with an internal memorandum in mid-September
1960, urging that second interrogations of other perpetrators or former
death camp insiders like Hermann Pfannenstiel, Kurt Franz, and
159. Letter from Dietrich Zeug to Rudolf Reder, (Nov. 30, 1959) (on file with BArch B
162/3165).
160. Roman Robak Interrogation, supra note 155.
161. Letter from Dietrich Zeug to Thomas Friedmann, (Jan. 27, 1960) (on file with BArch B
162/3166).
162. Letter from Robinson of World Jewish Congress to Schüle, BArch B 162/3167 (Feb. 29,
1960); see also Sworn Statement of Rudolf Reder/Roman Robak, BArch B 162/3166 (Jan.
26, 1960); Supplemental Sworn Statement of Rudolf Reder, BArch B 162/3166 (Feb. 12, 1960).
163. Robak Interrogation, supra note 155.
164. 4th Criminal Chamber of the Regional Court of Munich.
165. Letter from Chief Prosecutor associated with the Regional Court of Munich I to Schüle,
(Sept. 6, 1960) (on file with BArch B 162/3169).
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Heinrich Gley be conducted to elicit such evidence. Zeug also
recommended that the trial records pertaining to T-4 crimes at Hadamar
and Grafeneck be revisited, insofar as “ninety-two members of the
‘Führer’s Chancellery’ were assigned to ‘Operation Reinhard’”—
meaning that a more thorough analysis of the trial documentation might
yield the identities of witnesses capable of incriminating Oberhauser.166
The memo pointed out that follow-up analyses of records at the Berlin
Document Center had enabled the investigating magistrate in
Düsseldorf to deepen his understanding of the personnel assigned to
Treblinka. Zeug closed with a suggestion that the homes of Oberhauser,
Unverhau, Girtzig, and Gley be searched. House searches of Treblinka
suspects, including Franz and the widows of former Belzec
commandants Christian Wirth and Gottlieb Hering, had produced
valuable inculpatory materials like photo albums, photographs, and
correspondence with other compromised persons.167
Unsurprisingly, additional interrogations of Oberhauser ended in
more equivocation and stonewalling. Oberhauser did not deny his
presence at Belzec; rather, he insisted he was sent there, not to assist
with the extermination of Jews, but “to gather war material in the area
around Belzec.” The death camp had not yet been constructed when he
arrived on the site in the fall of 1941. Oberhauser continued:
My cleaning up operation lasted until the summer of 1942. Mostly I
supervised 10 to 20 Ukrainians in transporting firearms, ammunition,
barbwire, among other things, from the military equipment depot to
Lubica and Ravaruska and loading them there in railcars. Sometime
in the spring of 1942—there was still snow—the Belzec death camp
was built. At first only barracks were set up, which were enclosed
with barbwire. As far as I can remember, the SS Central
Construction Management of Lublin was responsible for the camp’s
construction; it used Polish civilian workers in this task. Later on the
camp was continuously rebuilt and enlarged. This occurred under the
supervision and direction of the camp commandant, with the
assistance of Ukrainian units under his command. I would like to
point out that I was never in Belzec for very long, but only for a few
days. My longest stay lasted around 14 days, and this was at the
168
beginning of the cleaning up operation.

166. Opinion on the Memorandum from Chief Prosecutor Dr. Bader of Sept. 6, 1960 (Sept.
15, 1960) (on file with BArch B 162/3169).
167. Id.
168. Josef Oberhauser Interrogation, BArch B 162/3169 (Sept. 15, 1960).
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Oberhauser denied any involvement in constructing the gassing
equipment and disclaimed knowledge of experimental gassings at the
camp.169 The challenge facing the Central Office investigators and the
Munich prosecutor’s office was to refute this defense. Curiously, the
source of rebuttal came not from the lone surviving prisoner of Belzec,
Rudolf Reder, but from other camp guards—Robert Lorent, Heinrich
Gley, Werner Dubois, Karl Schluch, and Robert Jührs. On the strength
of their interrogations, a new arrest warrant was issued for Oberhauser
on November 20, 1961. The authorities arrested Oberhauser on
December 4, 1961.170 Oberhauser was the leading defendant in the
Munich prosecutor’s indictment of eight former Belzec staff members
on August 8, 1963.171
V. EYELESS IN MUNICH: THE BELZEC INDICTMENT AND TRIAL
The Munich prosecutor’s theory of criminal liability portrayed the
Belzec defendants as accomplices in the murders committed in the
death camp.172According to this theory—reminiscent of the Ulm court’s
approach to the Tilsit Einsatzgruppen defendants in 1958—Hitler,
Himmler, and Heydrich originated the plan for the Final Solution in the
course of preparing for the invasion of the USSR. Implementation of the
plan was entrusted to the SS. Nazi leaders assumed sole responsibility
for the program of extermination. Rather than instigate the on-site actors
to their crimes, the leadership made them responsible only for carrying
out their orders. “[Nazi leaders] were the givers of orders who
demanded unconditional obedience from their subordinates,” and thus
the leadership qualified as “perpetrators actively willing an intentional
killing.” The killing of hundreds of thousands of Jews at the death
camps of Poland constituted murder under the German homicide law,
section 211 StGB, because it was motivated by racial animus—a “base
motive” under the statute.173
Having branded Hitler and his closest henchmen as the “primary”
murderers (Haupttäter), the indictment asserted the objective and
subjective illegality of the genocide. “The objective illegality of the
169. Id. (“I had nothing to do with the concentration and destruction of the Jewish population
in the East. I was never an observer of a gassing or any other mass execution.”).
170. Letter from the Prosecutor’s Office Associated with the Regional Court of Munich I (Dr.
Ultsch) to the Central Office, BArch B 162/3171 (Dec. 22, 1961).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Strafgesetzbuch § 211, DEJURE.ORG, http://dejure.org/gesetze/StGB/211.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2013); Indictment, Josef Oberhauser et al., 22 Js 68/61, BArch B 162/3173
[hereinafter Oberhauser Indictment].
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ordered mass extermination of innocent people requires, in view of the
monstrousness and brutality of the measure . . . no further proof.” 174
Moreover, Hitler and his followers were aware of the illegality of their
actions, as proven by the cloak of secrecy draped over the planning and
execution of the Final Solution. As for the defendants, they were subject
to a “special jurisdiction” by virtue of their membership in the SS,
which made them amenable to the provisions of the
Militärstrafgesetzbuch (Military Penal Code) as well as to the
jurisdiction of SS and police courts. On this analysis, the orders of
Heydrich’s office and its subsidiaries in the chain of command were
equivalent to military orders.
According to the indictment, “the defendants ordered to assist in
175
killing the Jews . . . had no opportunity for discretionary action.”
Hence, their criminal responsibility for carrying out orders was to be
determined by section 47 of the Military Penal Code. Section 47
ascribed fundamental responsibility to the commanding officer
whenever the execution of his orders violated a criminal law.176 The
subordinate carrying out these orders was punishable as an accomplice
so long as he was aware of the criminal nature of the order. The
prosecutor then applied the principles of liability under section 47 to the
defendants in order to characterize them as accomplices:
It is obvious that Hitler’s extermination order and the further orders
issued for implementation of the crime . . . were contentually illegal.
The illegality of the mass annihilation of innocent persons without
respect to their age or gender was clear to the defendants, as they
have admitted. They knew that the acts commanded of them were
criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances. The defendants
are accordingly criminally liable as accomplices [Teilnehmer] for
their actions in accordance with section 47 I 2b, Military Penal
Code.177

The indictment added that its classification of the defendants as
accomplices was proper because “there was no indication the
defendants, who were in a strict command relationship, had participated
in the destruction of the Jews on their own initiative . . . . Likewise, no
exceeding of orders is apparent.”178 Insofar as they had “supported
174. Oberhauser Indictment, supra note 173.
175. Id.
176. See generally Paola Gaeta, The Defense of Superior Orders: The Statute of the
International Criminal Court Versus Customary International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 172, 175–
76 n.6 (1999).
177. Oberhauser Indictment, supra note 173.
178. Id.
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through their actions the purposes of the perpetrators, i.e., the actions of
another,” they were accessories to murder.179
The indictment brushed aside the arguments raised by the
defendants that would later result in dismissal of the case against seven
of them. Oberhauser, Gley, Jührs, Schluch, and Zierke claimed they had
no possibility of escaping participation in mass murder at Belzec, and
for this reason took no steps to evade their orders.180 They were fearful
that refusal to follow orders would jeopardize their lives, resulting in
either a death sentence pronounced by a military court for failing to
obey an order, or summary execution for open insubordination.181
While conceding Wirth’s brutality, the indictment dismissed the
duress argument raised by Oberhauser on the ground that it did not fit
his proven image as the “obedient subordinate, stooping to carry out
criminal orders unconditionally out of loyalty to command authority and
a falsely understood sense of duty.”182 For the prosecution, there was no
sign that Oberhauser’s will had been “bowed by the generally prevailing
situation of terror induced by the National Socialist state and by his
superior Wirth.”183 The indictment likewise rejected the duress
arguments of the other defendants, insofar as they could have tried to
extricate themselves from participation in genocide without incurring
Wirth’s wrath.184
None of the accused denied his involvement in killing Jews at
Belzec, nor did any of them deny knowing that the extermination of
Jews at Belzec was wrongful. Rather, during the preliminary
investigation conducted by the examining magistrate, the defendants
invoked the defense of duress.185 They argued that they feared for their
lives unless they complied with their superiors’ orders. Werner Dubois
claimed he “inwardly” condemned the destruction of the Jews, but
added that “an open refusal to obey orders” would have “certainly led to
his own liquidation.”186 He recounted that during his work with the
euthanasia program he had sought release from T-4, an effort that
elicited warnings from his superior that if he persisted he would be sent
to a concentration camp. Given Wirth’s “ruthlessness” and
“unscrupulousness,” Dubois had little doubt that further requests for a
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
DE MILDT, supra

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

note 5, at 276–77.
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transfer would endanger his life. On one occasion, Wirth had threatened
Dubois with his pistol, provoking Dubois to draw his own pistol in selfdefense. The triviality of the incident that prompted Wirth to threaten
Dubois’s life foreshadowed Wirth’s likely response to the far more
serious request for reassignment.187
Fuchs and Unverhau likewise insisted they did everything in their
power to reduce their participation in mass killing “to a minimum” and
to secure a transfer from Belzec “as soon as possible.”188 Fuchs, like
Dubois, claimed his superior officer in Berlin had threatened him with
internment in a concentration camp should he try to dodge his service
through “gimmicks.” Also like Dubois, he came to appreciate the
suicidal nature of disobeying Wirth’s commands. Once, Fuchs tried to
avoid an order from Wirth to install dummy showerheads in the gassing
barracks. When Wirth discovered his dereliction, he struck Fuchs with
his riding crop and ordered his execution.189 Only the intervention of his
colleagues Fichtner and Niemann spared him this fate. According to
Fuchs, this experience taught him that any opposition to Wirth’s orders
would entail a “direct danger to his own life.” 190
Unverhau recited a near facsimile of Dubois’s defense, claiming he
was threatened with internment when he had sought reassignment from
T-4.191 While on leave from his grisly chores at Belzec, he approached
the T-4 offices about a transfer from the death camp. Wirth learned of
Unverhau’s request and, on his return from leave, berated Unverhau in
the presence of the other men.192 Wirth’s censure climaxed with Wirth
drawing his gun and threatening to shoot Unverhau. Refusing a Wirth
order was “equivalent to suicide.”193
Gley, Jührs, Schluch, and Zierke reprised the same duress
arguments as their co-defendants. They argued that “they had seen no
practicable way to escape their participation in the extermination
program.”194 The decree dismissing the case continued:
For this reason they took no steps to avert their orders and carried
them out. In the event of a refusal to follow orders—as they were
convinced at the time—they would have risked their lives, insofar as
187. Decree of the 4th Penal Chamber of the Munich Regional Court I (on file with BArch B
162/3172).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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they would have either been sentenced to death by an SS and Police
Court or shot without legal procedure on account of open defiance.
This last possibility is a natural assumption based on the
195
personalities of both camp commandants Wirth and Hering.

The prosecutor objected to this line of argumentation on the
grounds that a “genuine condition of duress, such as presupposed by
section 52 of the Penal Code, did not exist here.”196
For the prosecution, the defendants were legally obligated to incur
“a certain degree of risk in order to avoid involvement in the crimes.”197
They could have sought a transfer during their furloughs outside the
camp, and in this manner avoided the unpleasantries of filing such a
request directly with Wirth or Hering. Imminent threats to their lives
could thereby have been averted. The Munich regional court completed
its summary of the prosecution’s counterargument: “The defendants had
to accept being reviled as a coward or suffering disadvantages to their
career.”198
The court ultimately agreed with the defendants and dismissed the
indictments against them.199 The verdict revealed the improbability of
prosecuting death camp guards successfully in the absence of Jewish
survivor testimony. The court began its analysis by noting that the mere
assertion of duress was not enough to refute the charge of aiding and
abetting murder at Belzec. The defendants also had to show that their
claims of duress were supported by evidence (“factual indications”)
before they could prevail.200 The threshold question, then, was whether
the evidence presented was sufficient to bolster the defendants’ claim
and stop the indictment against them in its tracks. The court answered
this question in the affirmative:
[I]n the case at bar the preliminary investigation has yielded
numerous factual indications, showing that the defendants’
assertions they continuously sought release from the offices
of T-4 (Fuchs, Unverhau), or saw no possibility of evading
participation in the extermination of Jews at Belzec without
endangering their lives and therefore carried out the orders

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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communicated to them (Gley, Jührs, Schluch, Zierke), cannot
201
be adequately refuted.

For the court, it was significant that none of the defendants
occupied prominent positions within the Nazi state. They were forced to
go to Lublin, where they were given nominal SS ranks and plugged into
the lowest levels of a camp administration “built on military
principles.”202 “Under these circumstances,” the court affirmed, “the
possibilities available to the defendants for successfully avoiding
participation in mass killing without considerable danger to their own
person was at the outset restricted to a minimum.”203
In assessing the range of discretionary action confronting the
defendants, the court focused “not only on their subordinate positions,”
but also on “the mentality of their superior officers.”204 Christian Wirth
and Gottfried Hering were “characterized by all the defendants in the
same way: they were not persons able to entertain any contrary ideas [to
their own].”205 The court continued:
[Wirth and Hering] were described as ruthless and fanatical National
Socialists, from who it could be seriously feared they would react
violently in the event the unconditional obedience they demanded
were to be refused. The fact that Wirth was a person of almost
unrivalled brutality emerges not only from his behavior toward the
defendants Dubois, Fuchs, and Unverhau, but may also be
considered proven based on the total results of the investigatory
206
proceeding.

In sum, the defendants had good reason to fear that open refusal of
orders—including the criminal orders authorizing and enforcing the
Final Solution—could have led to their immediate punishment by an SS
and Police court. Like the crime of desertion, which was punished with
draconian ferocity in SS courts and in military courts-martial during the
war, defiance of orders to participate in the genocide of Jews at Belzec
would have resulted in “certain death.”207
The court’s analysis accepted the defendants’ exculpatory claims
on their face because no other evidence existed to contradict them.
Thus, it was accepted as true that Dubois, Fuchs, and Unverhau did

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2012]

Eichmann Trial Witnesses

369

indeed seek to extricate themselves from their work at Belzec. The court
also assumed that these three defendants carefully considered the
potential results of disobeying orders and determined that refusal would
result in their own deaths. Instead, Fuchs and Unverhau sought to limit
their involvement in the genocide as much as possible. Gley, Jührs,
Schluch, and Zierke, on the other hand, did not try to secure
reassignment from Belzec, but their inaction was due to their
assumption that such efforts would be both hopeless and likely fatal to
themselves. Given these circumstances—all of the allegations made by
the defendants that were unrefuted by adverse witnesses—the court held
that “intentional participation in a criminal act cannot be upheld against
them.”208
Elsewhere in its decree, the court appeared to follow a theory of
Putativnötigungsstand (“putative duress”).209 On this theory, even if an
actual situation of duress did not exist, the defense would nonetheless
apply where the defendants genuinely believed they faced a danger to
their own lives for refusing their orders.210 Whether actual or putative
duress was applied, however, the result was the same: the case against
the seven was dismissed, leaving Josef Oberhauser as the only
remaining defendant when his trial began in January 1965.211
Oberhauser, Wirth’s intimate and his liaison with Globocnik in
Lublin, also tried to raise a duress defense. However, the panel of lay
assessors was unconvinced. They found instead that he had never tried
to escape or mitigate the tasks given to him; rather, he “implemented
them in unswerving adherence to orders” without considering
possibilities for avoiding them.212 In short, Oberhauser didn’t act with
208. Id. The court’s reasoning followed the regnant paradigm of criminal analysis in German
law set forth by Ernst Behling in 1906, according to which proof of “guilt” (Schuld) was
necessary for conviction even when the actor had fulfilled all the elements of the offense
(Tatbestandsmäβigkeit). In the Belzec case, the defendants indeed fulfilled the elements of aiding
and abetting murder, but no attribution of guilt was possible, given the context of duress in which
they had allegedly acted. Hans Welzel, Die Deutsche Strafrechtliche Dogmatik der Letzten 100
Jahre und die Finale Handlungslehre, 11 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 421 (1966).
209. See generally George Fletcher et al., European Responses to World War Two War
Criminals and Human Rights Violators: National and Comparative Perspectives, 8 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 3, 14–15 (1988) (Symposium).
210. Id.
211. Decree of the 4th Penal Chamber of the Munich Regional Court I, supra note 187. The
prosecution appealed the case to the appellate court of Munich (Penal Senate), which on July 22,
1964, upheld the dismissal. The appellate court’s reasoning was identical to that of the regional
court (at one point in the verdict, it virtually lifted a block of text from the regional court’s
opinion), holding that the defendants’ defense of duress could not be disproven. Decree of the
Appellate Court of Munich—Penal Senate, (July 22, 1964) (on file with BArch B 162/3172).
212. Josef Oberhauser Interrogation, ZStL 208 AR-Z 252/59 (Dec. 12, 1960).
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the belief that he was enmeshed “in a hopeless dilemma.” The lay
assessors based their interpretation on the proven fact that Wirth trusted
Oberhauser as a fellow Nazi of impeccable reliability: “Oberhauser’s
preferential position, which, in the eyes of bystanders, cast him as
Wirth’s ‘adjutant,’ ‘constant companion,’ or ‘shadow,’ supports the
inference that Wirth . . . believed he had found a man in the defendant
who was, from an ideological perspective, reliable and from whom he
expected no difficulties in implementing the measures of extermination
ordered by the government.”213
Even after Wirth’s promotion to inspector of the three death camps
and his transfer to his new workplace in Lublin, he ensured that
Oberhauser would be available to work for him in his new post.
According to the court, “this fact likewise indicates that Wirth valued
the defendant as a conscientious subordinate, one who supported the
government without reservation and readily performed his service.”214
Other features of Oberhauser’s service with Operation Reinhard
undercut his defense that he had acted reluctantly and under duress. In
March 1943, Himmler authorized the promotion of the “best men and
leaders involved in [Operation Reinhard]” after visiting Belzec,
Treblinka, and Sobibor.215 Based on Globocnik’s recommendation,
which was influenced by Wirth, Oberhauser was promoted to
Untersturmführer (SS-Lieutenant). The court observed that this
elevation from a non-commissioned rank to an officer rank was
exceptionally rare, particularly for persons of Oberhauser’s “educational
background.”216 Such promotions were reserved for persons considered
by the Nazi leadership to be “ideologically and militarily”
irreproachable. From these predicate facts, the court concluded that
Oberhauser “would never have been promoted to SS officer if he had
condemned the measures ordered by the state authorities as a crime,
thereby showing he lacked the unconditional obedience and hardness
demanded of the SS officer.”217
After the regional court rejected Oberhauser’s various defenses, it
was faced with determining the crimes for which Oberhauser would be
convicted. The Munich court followed the analysis of earlier West
German trials related to the Nazis’ Final Solution. First, the court
affirmed that the Final Solution met the Penal Code’s definition of
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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murder under section 211 (both the old and new versions).218 As we
have seen, the newer version of section 211 defined a killing as murder
when it was driven by “base motives” like racial animus or carried out
in a “cruel” or “deceptive” manner.219 The process of mass murder at
Belzec, as recounted by eyewitnesses, fulfilled each of these criteria.
Moreover, the top Nazis who devised the scheme to murder
Europe’s Jewish population knew their plan was illegal. They sought to
conceal the Final Solution from the public by declaring it a “top secret
matter” (Geheime Reichssache), the “highest level of secrecy” attached
to a government program.220 On this analysis, then, Hitler and his
confederates in crime were direct perpetrators acting in concert.
How, then, did Oberhauser fit into this schematic of perpetration?
To answer this question, the court agreed with the prosecution that
Oberhauser was subject to a “special military judicial jurisdiction”221
based on his membership in the SS. Therefore, Oberhauser was subject
to the provisions of the German Military Penal Code and military
criminal law, as well as the jurisdiction of the SS and Police Courts.
Furthermore, the court declared that Hitler’s order to implement the
Final Solution, including all subsequent orders to carry out the
genocide, was a military command.222 This meant that Oberhauser’s
offense had to be evaluated in light of section 47 of the Military Penal
Code, which defined the criminal liability of subordinates acting on
218. Before 1941, section 211 of the German Penal Code defined murder as a premeditated
killing: “whoever intentionally kills a person, if he carried out the killing with premeditation, is
guilty of murder for that killing.” W. VON HENLE & F. SCHIERLINGER, STRAFGESETZBUCH FÜR
DAS DEUTSCHE REICH 227 (1912). In 1941, section 211 was revised; the effect was to redefine
murder as a killing impelled by certain motives. “A murderer is any one who kills another person
out of joy in killing, satisfaction of the sexual drive, covetousness or other base motives,
maliciously or cruelly or by means endangering the community or for the purpose of making
possible or concealing the commission of another crime.” LOTHAR DOMBROWSKI,
STRAFGESETZBUCH:
TEXTAUSG.
M.
D.
WICHTIGSTEN
NEBENGESETZEN
U.
KONTROLLRATSGESETZEN 83 (1948). The new version of section 211, although justified by Nazi
jurists at the time on National Socialist ideological grounds, “survived postwar efforts to denazify
German law”—perhaps because it was modeled on a Swiss statute—“and continues unchanged
until today.” See MICHAEL S. BRYANT, CONFRONTING THE “GOOD DEATH”: NAZI EUTHANASIA
ON TRIAL, 1945–1953 119–20 (2005).
219. For the West German jurisprudence on murder, see the discussion of section 211 of the
West German Penal Code in EDUARD DREHER & HERBERT TRONDLE, STRAFGESETZBUCH UND
NEBENGESETZE 1102 (40th ed., 1981).
220. GERALD FLEMING, HITLER AND THE FINAL SOLUTION 22 (1982).
221. Oberhauser, like all SS men, was amenable to this “special jurisdiction” by virtue of the
“Decree Concerning Special Judicial Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters for Members of the SS and
Police Units Involved in Special Operations,” enacted on October 17, 1939 (Reichsgesetzblatt I,
2107).
222. Id.
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orders of their superiors.223 According to section 47, the commanding
officer bears sole responsibility if the performance of an order violates
criminal law.224 The subordinate is liable as an accomplice if he was
aware that the order involved actions “that aimed at a general or military
crime or wrongful act.”225
The court then applied these tenets of liability to Oberhauser’s
case. “It is obvious,” explained the court, “that Hitler’s extermination
order and the orders issued for its execution aimed at the commission of
crimes—namely, the killing of human beings without any justification
whatsoever—which were illegal based on their contents.”226 Oberhauser
admitted he had understood the patent illegality of killing innocent men,
women, and children, but claimed he had acted under duress. This
defense, the court held, was not available to him:
[I]n carrying out his orders, the defendant, as the disciple of the Nazi
absolutist state and as an obedient SS non-commissioned officer,
acted in unwavering devotion to his orders, never seriously
considered disobeying these orders nor pondered the possibility of
evading participation in the mass murder demanded of him.
Accordingly, the criminal acts were not wrung from him through
imminent threats to life and limb; his will wasn’t perverted through
227
such a threat.

The regional court found that Oberhauser had assisted
implementation of the Final Solution with full understanding of its
illegality.228 He was aware of the cruelty of the killings carried out at
Belzec, as well as of the fact that “the innocence and defenselessness of
the victims were exploited.”229 However, he did not act “with the will of
the perpetrator” (Täterwille).230 Rather, because no evidence was
223. Militär-Strafgesetzbuch [MILITARY PENAL CODE], June 20, 1872, § 47 (Ger.).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Oberhauser Indictment, supra note 173.
227. Id.
228. Id. (“He knew that the killing operations had been planned and prepared long
beforehand, and that solely racial and political considerations were decisive for the intention to
commit the crime.”).
229. Id.
230. The “will of the perpetrator” refers to the criterion followed by the West German
Supreme Court that distinguished between a “perpetrator” (Täter) and an accomplice (Gehilfe).
The perpetrator, who acts with the “intention of the author” of the crime (animus auctoris), is
either the initiator of it, or possesses an attitude of sympathy with the crime such that he or she
embraces it “as his/her own” (als eigene gewollt). The accomplice, by contrast, does not inwardly
identify with the crime, but contributes to its commission on behalf of another person (animus
socii). However, a subordinate actor who can be proven to have inwardly approved of the crime,
such as by committing actions in excess of his or her orders, may be convicted as a “co-
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presented at trial proving that he had ever exceeded his orders,
Oberhauser had acted only with the “will of an accomplice”
(Gehilfenwille).231 He was convicted of five counts of complicity to
murder in the deaths of at least 150 Jews by supervising their unloading
on arrival in the camp and one count of complicity in the deaths of at
least 300,000 Jews by procuring building materials for the gassing
facilities. After weighing factors in mitigation and aggravation, the
court imposed a prison sentence of 4.5 years.232
Oberhauser’s conviction salvaged a largely failed effort to
prosecute the staff at the Belzec death camp. Some of the acquitted were
indicted in other Operation Reinhard trials involving Treblinka and
Sobibor,233 while the rest were able to evade judicial punishment for
their involvement in the Final Solution.234 With an acquittal rate of
nearly 88 percent, it is hard to regard the Belzec trial as anything less
than a debacle. The reason for its failure was a lack of witnesses able to
contradict the defendants’ protests that they had acted under duress.235
For example, the testimony of the lone Jewish survivor of Belzec,
Rudolf Reder, was negligible to the outcome of the trial.236 The most
incriminating evidence he offered—which, in the final analysis, counted
for little in the court’s dismissal of charges against seven of the eight
accused—was his statement that “reluctant conduct of the SS
personnel” at Belzec was never apparent.237 The problem for the Belzec

perpetrator” (Mittäter). See A. Eser, Strafrecht, in 5 STAATSLEXIKON 331–43 (1989); see also
Jescheck and Weigend’s exposition of perpetrator and accomplice liability, HANS-HEINRICH
JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 580 (4th ed., 1988).
231. Id.; see also DE MILDT, supra note 5, at 278–79.
232. Eser, supra note 230, at 331–43; JESCHECK, supra note 230, at 580. The court punished
Oberhauser based on the principle of Tatmehrheit (joinder of offenses): in other words, he was
not punished for the Final Solution (the “main crime,” or Haupttat, for which only perpetrators
were chiefly responsible), but only for his “numerous accessorial actions.” These were committed
at various times, and were triggered by new orders issued by his superiors. Ultimately, the panel
of lay assessors imposed a prison term of 3.5 years for complicity in the murder of 300,000
people and 3 years for five counts of complicity in the murder of at least 150 people. From these
“individual punishments” (Einzelstrafe), the assessors arrived at a “total punishment”
(Gesamtstrafe) of 4.5 years. Note that in cases such as Oberhauser’s, in which the defendant
committed multiple criminal acts, the total punishment under German law must always be higher
than the most severe punishment for any one act, but may not equal or exceed the sum of all the
individual punishments.
233. See DE MILDT, supra note 5, at 257–98. Acquitted defendants prosecuted in subsequent
trials were Karl Werner Dubois, Robert Jührs, Heinrich Unverhau, and Ernst Zierke.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 276.
236. Id.
237. ERNST KLEE, 15 WAS SIE TATEN – WAS SIE WURDEN 161 (1998).
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trial was the Nazis’ lethal efficiency in eliminating human life,
including the witnesses who could later testify against them.
VI. FORTUNE’S SHIFTING SANDS: EICHMANN TRIAL WITNESSES
AND THE WEST GERMAN TREBLINKA TRIAL
Although the Israelis could not find survivors of Belzec as
requested by the Ludwigsburg authorities, they were far more
successful with Treblinka and Sobibor. In the fall of 1959, Tuviah
Friedman, director of the Institute for the Documentation of Nazi War
Crimes in Haifa, sent the Central Office in Ludwigsburg the names of
ten survivors of Treblinka. Over the next four years, the Israelis
provided the Central Office and the Düsseldorf prosecutor in charge of
preparing the Treblinka trial with the statements of witnesses examined
by the Israeli police. When the Düsseldorf prosecutor issued his
indictment of fourteen members of the Treblinka death camp staff on
January 29, 1963, the list of ninety-seven witnesses included at least
four survivors who had testified at the Eichmann trial.238
Ya’akov Wiernik was a Polish Jewish carpenter deported from
Warsaw to Treblinka on August 23, 1942. Due to his carpentry skills, he
was spared the fates of most Jews sent to Treblinka.239 During his oneyear imprisonment there, he and other “work Jews” built the
guardroom, the entrance gate to the camp, and some of the camp’s
barracks.240 At the Eichmann trial, Wiernik testified chiefly about the
structure of the Treblinka camp, based on a detailed map he had drafted
in 1944. Although his name rarely appears in the text of the Treblinka
judgment, Wiernik was often cited as a government witness in the
Düsseldorf prosecutor’s indictment. He testified at length not only about
the dimensions of the camp, but also described atrocities committed by
the defendants that he personally observed. He was an especially
important witness for the prosecution in showing that the Final Solution
at Treblinka met the criteria of murder under German Penal Code § 211,
which, as we have seen, required a killing to bear certain legally defined
characteristics. These included killings arising from base motives (i.e.,
racial hatred), deception, or cruelty.241

238. Letter of Tuviah Friedman to Gerichtsassessor Zeug (Dec. 27, 1959) (on file with BArch
B 162/3166).
239. Indictment, K. Franz et al., BArch B 162/3849.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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Wiernik, along with other Jewish survivors who had testified at the
Eichmann trial,242 described how an orchestra consisting of camp
prisoners, which, in the language of the indictment, played “in a
cheerful and happy style,” greeted Warsaw deportees on arrival at the
camp.243 The SS had arranged the orchestra for the purpose of reassuring
the deportees as they were led to the gas chambers. Disguised as shower
rooms, the killing facilities had signs posted along the way informing
the victims that Treblinka was a “transit camp” from which they would
later be sent to work camps. The final sentence on the signs indicated
that all the deportees had to bathe in the interests of personal hygiene.
Prisoners were required to disrobe and surrender all of their personal
effects for disinfection. Receipts were given to them for their
valuables.244 The fraud was then reinforced by speeches delivered by
camp guards, reassuring the victims that they were merely being asked
to shower before assignment to labor detail. Such duplicity, for both the
prosecutor and the court, met the definition of Heimtücke (“deception”)
under the German homicide law.245
Wiernik also described scenes of pure horror, in which Jews
stripped of their clothing shivered in the winter cold outside the gas
chamber. As they waited for their promised shower, the screams of
other Jews being gassed inside assailed their ears.246 Occasionally the
diesel motors used to generate lethal carbon monoxide fumes broke
down, and repairs lasting hours were made as the next group to be
gassed froze outside in the bitter winter temperatures. For the prosecutor
and the court, this aspect of the killing process met the element of
Grausamkeit (“cruelty”) under the German homicide law.247 Wiernik
and other Eichmann trial witnesses proved that the killings at Treblinka
were murder. However, this by itself would not have been enough to
secure convictions of the defendants. Specific contributions by each
defendant to the mass murder had to be shown.
Witness testimony was essential to the conviction of the most
notorious figure among the defendants, Kurt Franz. Franz, in contrast
with several of his co-defendants, denied every allegation made against

242. Id. (identifying Kalman Taigman, Abraham Lindwasser, and Elihu Rosenberg).
243. Id.
244. See “Operation Reinhard”: The Extermination Camps of Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka,
in 16 YAD VASHEM STUDIES (Aharon Weiss ed., 1984), available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/reinhard.html#8.
245. C. F. RUETER & D. W. DE MILDT, 22 JUSTIZ UND NS-VERBRECHEN (2001).
246. Indictment of K. Franz et al., BArch B 162/3848; RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 245.
247. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 245.
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him.248 Although he was the worst of the accused, he contested every
charge and at no point during or after the trial did he express the faintest
degree of remorse for his actions or sympathy for the victims.249
A member of the SS before the outbreak of the war, Franz was sent
to Berlin in late 1939, where he was initiated into Operation T-4.250
Franz was assigned to a camouflage office in charge of the “euthanasia”
program, the Gemeinnützigen Stiftung für Anstaltspflege (“Charitable
Foundation for Institutional Care”), and thereafter served in a series of
killing centers: Grafeneck in Württemberg, Hartheim Castle near Linz,
Sonnenstein in Saxony, and Brandenburg near Berlin. Between late
1941 and early 1942, Franz was transferred to the actual executory
organ of the euthanasia program, the Kanzlei des Führers (“Chancellery
of the Führer”), where he served as a cook in the Chancellery’s
building.251
In spring 1942, Franz, who had by now risen to the rank of SSScharführer (sergeant), was assigned to the guard force at the Belzec
death camp, where he remained until summer 1942.252 He was
subsequently transferred to Treblinka. On arrival he assumed command
of the Ukrainian guards (the so-called “Hiwis,” or “volunteers”), but the
range of his activities expanded significantly beyond supervising the
Ukrainians.253 As the regional court of Düsseldorf found, Franz quickly
became involved in administering the entire camp operation. Before
long he had risen to the position of deputy commander of the camp,
second only to Treblinka’s commandant at the time, SSHauptsturmführer (Captain) Franz Stangl. In the words of the court, “in
this capacity he held all the reins in his hand, exercising an unrestricted
influence on the entire course of activities within the camp, particularly
when the successor to Dr. Eberl . . . took little or no interest in the
external operation of the camp . . . .”254
As a ubiquitous figure inspecting work commandos and
monitoring the camp equipment in both the upper and lower sections of
Treblinka, Franz, in the words of the Düsseldorf court, “revealed a kind
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Operation T-4 was the top-secret program for the destruction of the mentally disabled. It
was code-named for the street in which the administrative office of the program was located,
Tiergartenstrasse, or “zoo street.”
251. Indictment of K. Franz et al., supra note 246.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 245, at 121, 127, 134, 136, 151, 230. The “successor
to Dr. Eberl” in the quotation above refers to Franz Stangl.
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of sadism and such contempt toward all Jewish life that can scarcely be
envisioned by the human imagination.”255 His seemingly inexhaustible
brutality was legendary. Jewish witnesses described Franz as the “terror
of the camp.”256 In its verdict, the court stated that “a large part of the
river of blood and tears that flowed through Treblinka may be laid
solely to his account.”257 The court arrived at this conclusion based on
testimony furnished by Eichmann trial witnesses. Wiernik, Kalman
Taigman, Elihu Rosenberg, and Abraham Lindwasser testified that
Franz never missed an opportunity to mistreat and kill Jewish
prisoners.258 Taigman was among several survivor witnesses who
recounted how Franz set his massive dog Bari on the hapless inmates,
severely wounding them and, in some cases, tearing them apart.259
Franz punished any prisoner resistance by executing the resister,
often in a grisly fashion. Taigman described one such incident, in which
Franz “selected” as many as 10 Jews and shot them with a pistol in front
of their fellow prisoners.260 Franz was clearly a sadist, delighting in his
malevolent power over the Jewish prisoners. He engaged in murderous
“sport” shooting of Jews with other Treblinka guards and competed
with them in contests to kill Jewish infants by smashing their skulls
against the barracks wall.261
Based on the voluminous witness testimony against him, the court
had no trouble classifying Franz as a “co-perpetrator” (Mittäter), insofar
as he subjectively identified with the Final Solution and strove with
gusto and dedication to carry it out.262 He was found guilty of
murdering at least 300,000 Jewish victims in connection with the Final
Solution; he was also convicted as a perpetrator of murder in the deaths
of at least 139 people, carried out entirely on his own initiative. The
regional court sentenced him to a life prison term.263
Two of Franz’s other colleagues at Treblinka were likewise
convicted of murder and given life sentences, largely on the strength of
Jewish survivor testimony (among them, former Eichmann trial

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.; Indictment, K. Franz et al., supra note 244.
259. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 245.
260. Id.
261. Id. Franz’s attacks on infants were confirmed by other eyewitnesses: Maniek
Platkiewicz, Moszek Laks, and Abraham Kolski. The source of the “sport shooting” incident was
Wolf Szejnberg.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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witnesses). Heinrich Arthur Matthes, who, like Franz, was a participant
in the Nazi regime’s murder of the disabled, was sent to Globocnik’s
office in Lublin in late August 1942. He received the rank of SSScharführer before assignment to Treblinka.264 At Treblinka, he was in
charge of the “upper camp,” comprising the extermination area. His
duties included overseeing all operations within the upper camp and
supervising the Arbeitsjuden (“work Jews”).265 Matthes was particularly
concerned with ensuring the frictionless operation of the killing process.
In fulfilling his tasks, the court found that Matthes was anything but
“squeamish”:
[Matthes] struck out with his leather whip at the prisoners whenever
it seemed necessary to him, or had them beaten by the capos. He was
lord over life and death of the Jews within the death camp
subordinate to him, and he could as he wished either beat or have
others beat the unfortunate people, but also kill them or have them
killed, when they for example were no longer able to work or some
266
other occasion arose.

Matthes’ defense was that he did nothing more than carry out the
orders given him, which were to guarantee an orderly procedure within
the upper camp.267 Matthes denied direct involvement in gassing Jews.
He claimed he never drove Jews into the gas chambers because, “as a
family man and nurse,” he did not “have the heart” to do it.268 He sought
out ways to absent himself while the victims were murdered, such as by
withdrawing into the kitchen of the upper camp to dine on soup.269 This
defense, according to the court, was refuted by both Matthes’ former
colleagues and by former Eichmann trial witnesses, who were
characterized by the court as “the most reliable of the witnesses.”270
These witnesses included Elihu Rosenberg and Abraham Lindwasser,
who testified that Matthes, as the “highest authority and boss” of the
extermination area, was present during the liquidation of the Jewish
transports.271
Not only did Matthes not retire into the kitchen to his soup, but he
demonstrated a zealous commitment to “overcoming all difficulties that

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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arose with great strictness and brutality.”272 Rosenberg and Lindwasser
testified that Matthes ordered the opening and shutting of the gas
chambers and personally supervised the gassing process.273 Rosenberg’s
testimony was especially damaging to Matthes, because he was able to
precisely identify specific victims by name that Matthes had
murdered.274 Lindwasser, on the other hand, was a crucial witness for
the prosecution because of his ability to recall specific atrocities and to
identify Matthes as the unquestionable perpetrator.275
The final defendant at the Treblinka trial convicted as a perpetrator
of murder was August Wilhelm Miete. Miete, like his colleagues, was a
veteran of the Nazi euthanasia program—he worked at Grafeneck and
incinerated the corpses of murder victims at Hadamar.276 Sometime
between late June and early July of 1942 he arrived in Lublin, donned
the field-gray uniform of a SS-Unterscharführer (“Lance Sergeant”),
and left for Treblinka. His duty station centered on the lower camp.
Together with other SS men, Miete shot elderly and ill Jews culled from
arriving transports.277 The victims were murdered in the camp clinic. He
also supervised commandos sent outside the camp to collect wood and
to perform other chores. One of his main functions was to supervise the
Sortierplatz (“sorting place”), where the victims’ clothing was searched
and packaged for shipment back to the Reich.278
Taigman was among the congeries of witnesses who attested to the
besonderen Eifer (“special zeal”) with which Miete performed his
duties. In unloading Jewish transports and herding them toward the gas
chambers, he “drove them in haste so as to preclude any reflection,
making frequent use of his whip. In many cases he also used his gun.”279
According to the court, Miete “moved like an evil spirit” through the
camp, dispensing death wherever he turned, thereby earning the
nickname among the prisoners of Todesengel (“angel of death”).280
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.; see also Rosenberg Interogation, BArch B 162/4431 (Feb. 11, 1961). Rosenberg
cites the names of work Jews shot by Matthes: Alek Weintraub, Josel Rosenbaum, and a third
victim named Dawid (Rosenberg could not recall the surname). Rosenberg’s memory was
prodigious: he not only identified Franz as “Lalka” (“puppet,” a nickname given to Franz because
of his well-groomed appearance), but identified the names of some of his victims, including
Mandel Nuessenbaum and Elieg Adlerstein.
276. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 245.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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The Düsseldorf regional court followed the analysis of the court in
the Ulm Einsatzgruppen case. The architects of the Final Solution—the
Nazi leadership (Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich, and Goering) but also
intermediate functionaries in the machinery of destruction (Globocnik
and Wirth)—were the main perpetrators of the Holocaust, while their
underlings who personally supported the genocide of the Jews were
guilty of mass murder as co-perpetrators. The defendants shared with
the top-level Nazis their racist loathing for the Jews. Franz
demonstrated “boundless zeal,” an “energy,” and a “persistence” in his
contributions to the murder of Jews and the Roma that was “in no way
inferior to the initiators of the crime.”281 Matthes’ “cruelty” and
“stubbornness” proved his “considerable agreement with the goals of
the National Socialist government.”282 Miete was a “bloodthirsty sadist
and a pitiless executioner” who exhibited an “unnatural joy in
killing.”283 All were convicted of murdering hundreds of thousands of
victims and sentenced to life terms in prison.284
VII. SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE: EICHMANN WITNESSES
AT THE SOBIBOR TRIAL
The West German inquiry into the Sobibor death camp emerged
from the Central Office’s investigations into Treblinka and Chelmno.
One of the Treblinka witnesses reported to the Israelis the name of a
Sobibor survivor, Edda (Ada) Lichtmann.285 A Polish Jew from Crakow,
she was transported with 7,000 other Jews to Sobibor in June 1942.286
On arrival, she and two other women were selected for work in the
camp’s laundry facility; all other women in the transport were gassed.
She and her two companions were housed in a small forest cabin
situated in a wooded area in Camp I (the administrative sector) near the
assembly point where recently arrived Jews were brought.287 “It was so
near,” Lichtmann reported, “that the people were only a few meters
away from me.”288 From this vantage point, she was able to observe the
arrivals of transports from Germany, Austria, Holland, France, and
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Statement of Edda Lichtmann, BArch B 162/4170 (June 19, 1968).
286. Id.
287. Eventually, as other female work Jews were added to the laundry detail, a larger
barracks was constructed to house them. C. F. RUETER & D. W. DE MILDT, 25 JUSTIZ UND NSVERBRECHEN, CASE NO. 642A (2001).
288. Statement of Edda Lichtmann, supra note 285.
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Czechoslovakia. She was also in a position to see interactions between
the SS guards and the arriving Jews.289
In late February 1960, Dietrich Zeug contacted Yad Vashem
requesting a statement from Lichtmann concerning her experiences in
Sobibor.290 One day later, Zeug asked an Israeli delegation in Cologne to
arrange for the interrogation of Sobibor survivors living in Israel. Zeug
identified nine survivors; four of the nine would later testify at both the
Eichmann trial in Jerusalem and the West German trial of eleven former
Sobibor guards in 1965.291 As his colleagues did in their investigation of
Belzec and Treblinka, Zeug appended a list of questions to be posed to
the witnesses. The most significant of these probed the witnesses’
knowledge of the names, ranks, and physical appearance of former SS
guards in the camp, and asked them to identify specific crimes
committed by these persons that the witnesses had observed with their
own eyes.292
This witness list was sent to the Israeli delegation and included the
names of Lichtmann and Moshe Bahir. Both would later offer powerful
testimony against Adolf Eichmann. Their testimony against former
Sobibor guards proved similarly effective. They were among the group
of six witnesses who identified Karl Frenzel from photographs shown
them during the investigation.293 After the suicide of the leading
defendant in the case, Kurt Bolender, on October 10, 1966, Frenzel
became the focus of the regional court's verdict.294 A carpenter and
butcher before the outbreak of the war, Frenzel worked in the euthanasia
gassing centers at Grafeneck, Hadamar, and Bernburg before his
assignment as an SS Staff Sergeant to Sobibor in the spring of 1942.295
Moshe Bahir related acts of brutality committed by Frenzel against
Jewish prisoners, including one of the most appalling episodes of the
many told during the trial. Bahir testified that Frenzel had discovered
that a work Jew had tried to commit suicide by slashing his wrists. As
the prisoner lay dying, Frenzel had him carried from his barracks to the
289. Id.
290. Letter from Dietrich Zeug to Yad Vashem, supra note 145.
291. One of the accused, Kurt Bolender, committed suicide before announcement of the
verdict; another, Erich Fuchs, was severed from the trial and prosecuted in a separate proceeding.
Id.
292. Id.; see also Dietrich Zeug, Questions Posed to Purchasing Delegation of the State of
Israel (Feb. 25, 1960) (on file with BArch B 162/4427) [hereinafter Zeug, Purchasing
Delegation].
293. C. F. RUETER & D. W. DE MILDT, 25 JUSTIZ UND NS-VERBRECHEN (2001) (Judgment in
the Criminal Case of Karl Frenzel et al., Case No. 642a).
294. Id.
295. Id.
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parade ground. Frenzel verbally abused the dying man, struck him with
his whip, and shot him in the presence of the assembled work Jews.296
Before dispatching the wretched man with his pistol, Frenzel addressed
himself to his audience, admonishing them that no Jew had the right to
take his own life; the decision over the life and death of Jews resided
only with the Germans. Only the Germans, said Frenzel, had the right to
kill.297
Adda Lichtman related an incident in which Frenzel caught an 11year-old Jewish boy with a can of sardines. Frenzel took the boy to the
sorting barracks where Lichtman worked, ordering the work Jews there
to watch the boy’s fate. He forced the boy to hold the can over his head
as Frenzel proclaimed that no Jew was permitted to eat foreign sardines.
He then drew his pistol and shot the boy in full view of the assembled
work Jews.298
Jakob Biskiewicz and five other survivor witnesses laid the
foundation of Frenzel’s conviction for killing 200 Jews selected from a
transport that arrived in Sobibor on June 10, 1942.299 The doomed
transportees from Biala Podlaska were unaware that Sobibor was an
extermination camp. One of them submitted a petition to the guards
requesting that they be treated well. The guards, enraged by this
“outrageous” and “insolent” conduct, decided that the Jews would pay
for their effrontery.300 Most of the transport Jews were sent to the gas
chambers, but 200 of them were forced to load packets from the sorting
barracks in Camp II into empty boxcars at the ramp. They performed
this chore at a constant run while the Germans and Ukrainians formed a
Gasse (alley) through which they had to run amid blows from clubs and
whips.301 As they moved through the Gasse, the dog Bari, brought to
Sobibor from Treblinka, was set on them for the sole purpose of
terrorizing and wounding the prisoners. Afterwards they were liquidated
in the gas chambers.302
Biskiewicz and other witnesses recalled the Gasse incident and
unanimously placed Frenzel at the scene. One of Frenzel’s co296. Id.
297. Id. at 134.
298. Lichtmann did not testify in person before the lay assessors (Schwurgericht), but
provided her testimony in Israel. Despite efforts by the defense to discredit her, the lay assessors
found her testimony reliable, in part because other witnesses corroborated it. Statement of Edda
Lichtmann, supra note 285.
299. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 293.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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defendants, Kurt Bolender, confirmed the Jewish witness statements,
adding that he had spoken with Frenzel several days after the alley
incident.303 Frenzel told him “he had missed out on the great fun, people
arrived with a petition, the Ukrainians were mustered, and the Jews
were beaten and battered.”304
Another witness, Berek Freiberg,305 testified to what the regional
court called eigenmächtige Tötungen (“unauthorized killings”) by
Frenzel—that is, murders perpetrated entirely on Frenzel’s own
initiative without the promptings of an order.306 These included two
gratuitous shootings. The first involved a transport of Jews who had
perished from hunger and debilitation during their lethal train journey to
the camp. Freiberg, a work Jew, discovered a man who had survived the
trip lying among the litter of corpses. Freiberg attended to him, helping
the distraught man to sit up as Freiberg consoled him. When Frenzel
noticed this act of compassion, he struck Freiberg repeatedly in the face
and shot the survivor on the spot.307
The second incident was strikingly like the first: as Freiberg was
dragging what he assumed was a dead body to a rail car, the “corpse”
sat up and asked Freiberg “whether it was still far away.”308 Freiberg
took his arm and escorted him to the rail car. Frenzel then arrived on the
scene, saw that the victim was still alive, and struck Freiberg with his
whip. Freiberg released the victim, who fell to the ground. Frenzel shot
him with his pistol.309 The regional court apparently felt moved to
append a moral and legal assessment310 of this dreadful incident
immediately after its recitation in the judgment: “[Frenzel] acted here
from his arrogance toward a Jew he regarded as a racial inferior, as well
as from a zeal in killing. Therefore he exceeded without thought the
scope of the commanded extermination procedure, according to which
debilitated Jews were to be taken for killing in Camp III.”311
Based on these and other events corroborated by Jewish survivors,
the Hagen court found that Frenzel’s killings were actuated by “base
303. Id.
304. Id. at 121.
305. Berek Freiberg, sometimes referred to as “Dov,” was also a witness in the Eichmann
trial.
306. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 293.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Courts typically reserved their legal (and sometimes ethical) evaluations of a defendant’s
conduct for the analytical sections of their verdict. Here, the court indicated already in its findings
that Frenzel was a perpetrator of murder under German law.
311. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 293, at 127.
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motives”—that is, a personal joy in murdering the Jews he considered
racial inferiors.312 He was convicted as a co-perpetrator in the murders
of at least 150,000 people and as a perpetrator acting alone in nine
instances. The court imposed a life sentence.313
VIII. CONCLUSION
The survivor-witnesses of Treblinka and Sobibor who testified
against Eichmann in his 1961 trial faced a very different task than
witnesses in the West German trials. Eichmann was not a low-level,
hands-on perpetrator of Holocaust violence but a mid-level bureaucrat,
albeit one with inordinate influence and powerful connections, who
designed train schedules and organized deportations to the camps.
Given his prominence within the system of death created by Nazi
leaders, it was enough to prove the appalling reality of the Final
Solution in order to convict him under Israeli law. This notwithstanding,
the Israeli prosecutor Gideon Hausner strove in vain to prove a single
case in which Eichmann had murdered anyone with his own hands.314
Efforts to link Eichmann with the murder of a Hungarian boy, the
Einsatzgruppen shooters in the east, or the organization and
maintenance of the Operation Reinhard camps all came to nothing and
the Israeli court dismissed each of these charges against him.315
Nonetheless, Eichmann’s very real contributions to the Holocaust—
particularly his merciless on-site exertions to deport Hungarian Jews to
the death camps and damning evidence of his personal zeal and antiSemitism—ultimately led to his conviction and execution.316
The situation was quite different in the West German death camp
trials. There, it had to be proved that men lacking command authority
had performed specific acts in violation of the German homicide law.
Mere presence in the death camp as a guard was not enough. In
proceedings where such proof was lacking, as at the abortive trial of
Belzec camp guards in January 1964, judges dismissed the case against
them. Jewish survivors who had testified against Eichmann provided the
critical evidence in the Treblinka and Sobibor trials that enabled the

312. Id.
313. Id. at 151, 230. Frenzel was the only one of the original eleven Sobibor defendants to be
convicted as a perpetrator of murder. Four other guards were convicted of “aiding and abetting
murder” (Beihilfe zum Mord), while the remaining five were acquitted. The acquitted included
Belzec veterans Jührs, Unverhau, and Zierke.
314. DEBORAH LIPSTADT, THE EICHMANN TRIAL: JEWISH ENCOUNTERS 117 (2011).
315. Id. at 99.
316. CESARANI, supra note 1, at 269–323.
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prosecutors to avoid this outcome. They not only tied the defendants to
murders within the camp, but also showed that their crimes met the
definition of perpetration under German homicide law. On the strength
of their testimony, the likes of Kurt Franz and Karl Frenzel were
convicted and given life sentences.
As we have seen, the first of the Operation Reinhard trials, Belzec,
was not a total failure. It successfully convicted Josef Oberhauser of
complicity to mass murder. His factually verified position within the
camp command structure was decisive in his conviction. His close
relationship with Wirth, his reputation as a stalwart National Socialist
that spurred his rapid ascent from non-commissioned to officer rank,
and his punctilious execution of his duties within the camp all belied his
claims of duress and inner rejection of genocide. The court’s analysis of
Oberhauser’s guilt was legally unobjectionable. Likewise, its
classification of Oberhauser as an accomplice rather than a perpetrator
of murder was in keeping with the prevailing jurisprudence in Nazi-era
cases tried in West German courts.
The Munich regional court did not invent the Gehilfen-Judikatur
(“accomplice jurisprudence”). This phrase is often applied as an epithet
to the judiciary’s practice of categorizing simple orders-followers as
accomplices while reserving the more serious label “perpetrator” for
high-ranking officials and Nazi killers who exceeded their orders.
Oberhauser’s classification as an accomplice was consistent with the
rules of complicity in West German criminal law. A close reading of the
investigation and trial yields no signs that the West German authorities
were biased in his favor.
Additionally, a study of the Belzec proceedings shows that Jewish
survivor-witnesses were critical to successful prosecution, particularly
of low-ranking guards lacking command authority. Such a thesis
becomes even more persuasive when we consider the main Treblinka
trial in Düsseldorf. Where Belzec marked the nadir of West German
prosecutions related to the Operation Reinhard camps, Treblinka was a
triumph. It was the anti-Belzec, the vindication of Ludwigsburg’s
exhaustive research and coordination. Like the Eichmann trial that
preceded it, the Treblinka proceeding afforded a place for Jewish
survivors to bear witness against their former tormentors. The victims
were not the nameless and faceless dead, as at the Belzec trial; they
were living, flesh-and-blood people with agile and retentive minds.
Their ability to refute the defenses of mass murderers was the crucial
factor in the trial’s success.
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In a perfect world, we might lament the delay in justice served. We
would deprecate the limitations of German law, with its distinction
between accomplices and perpetrators, its statute of limitations, and its
stubborn insistence on proof of a specific criminal act before convicting
a death camp guard. We would find fault with the Germans for focusing
on lower-level actors and their sensational crimes while exempting
higher-ranking professionals, like special court judges and Wehrmacht
officers, from criminal investigation. However, we would do well to
remember that for all their flaws, the conviction and punishment of men
like Oberhauser, Franz, Matthes, Miete, and Frenzel was a victory in the
cause of justice—a victory made possible by Jewish survivors and their
willingness to re-live the traumas and terrors of the death camp.

